



Media Research Report:

Dynamics of Media Representation of the Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process in Armenian and Turkish Media

Implementers:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is the first stage of a larger research effort to explore the dynamics of media representation of Armenia-Turkey normalization process in Armenian and Turkish media. The research is carried out by the Yerevan Press Club and the Faculty of Communication of the Izmir University of Economics within the framework of the “Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement” (SATR) project funded by USAID and implemented by Eurasia Partnership Foundation in a consortium with the Yerevan Press Club, Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen of Armenia, and International Center for Human Development, in collaboration with several Turkish partners.

The research seeks to show the dynamic of media representation of the key developments in the Armenia-Turkey normalization process in 2008-2010. The aims of the research include determining the dynamic of media coverage of the Armenia-Turkey normalization, with a particular focus on the Zurich protocols, and “for” and “against” argumentation that dominated the public debate. It also analyzes the media coverage of a wider set of issues, directly or indirectly connected to the normalization process. In other words, the research is trying to explore the image of Turkey and Turks in Armenian media and the image of Armenia and Armenians in Turkish media.

The research combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The latter is employed to establish the main trends of media coverage throughout the period in question and to move beyond simply stating the obvious trends, as well as to identify the discursive strategies that are used in the debate around the Armenia-Turkey relations. At the same time, quantitative data mainly serves as a background to the qualitative research. In the near future Yerevan Press Club and the Faculty of Communication of the Izmir University of Economics are planning to carry out a more thorough quantitative research in the form of simultaneous monitoring of media in Armenia and Turkey. The outcomes of the media monitoring will come to complement those of the current research.

The media publications analyzed in the framework of the research included the period between August 2008 and September 2010. In order to combine a wide time span with an in-depth research, the research team chose several short periods (from 15 days to two months) from the time span of the research to study media publications of these periods. The choice of these periods was conditioned by the developments in the Armenia-Turkey normalization process: months that included important events and developments were selected. Also 5 outlets from each side were selected for this research project. The choice of outlets was made in such a way that would ensure that outlets representing different political orientations and (in case of Turkey) different media groups were included in the research.

In the course of the study, the researchers identified several trends in the coverage of Armenia-Turkey relations in 2008 -2010 by Armenian and Turkish media. Publications dealing with Armenia-Turkey relations in the selected Armenian media outlets strongly outnumbered those in the selected Turkish media outlets (3,088 vs. 1,607 respectively). In Armenian media outlets Armenia-Turkey relations were often given higher importance not only compared to other foreign affairs issues but also compared to the news of domestic concern and/or on internal politics. The main focus through which Armenia-Turkey relations were analyzed was foreign policy,

however it was often interconnected with internal politics and history. At the same time, in Turkish media outlets, the Armenia-Turkey normalization process was presented primarily as a state-to-state official affair. The main subjects of stories, comments, and analysis published by Turkish media on Armenia-Turkey relations were of official (political or diplomatic) nature. Human interest stories, social/cultural aspects, non-government actors have been noticeably absent.

In terms of representation of the main actors in the media coverage of the Armenia-Turkey process, in the Armenian media the main actors were Armenia and Turkey (Armenians and Turks). Other actors mostly mentioned in the publications were the USA (the West), Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. At the same time, in Turkish media the US administration was a major third party. Interestingly enough that the emphasis on the US role was so extreme that the process was often presented as concerning more the Turkish-US relations than Turkey-Armenia relations. Azerbaijan was often presented as a significant third party, followed by the Armenian Diaspora. The latter was usually taken as the major negative element in the process.

The attitudes to the normalization process in Armenian media to a considerable extent followed the changing dynamics of the political context, both internal and external. Attitude to the Armenia-Turkey normalization process also reflected the political stance of a particular media outlet with regard to the internal Armenian politics, particularly, the attitude towards the government and the opposition. Symbolic-historical aspects, such as coincidence of milestone rapprochement events with certain historical dates of large symbolic significance, have strongly influenced the media coverage. Neutral attitudes towards the Armenia-Turkey normalization dominated the coverage in the Armenian media, while both negative and positive attitudes to the normalization process were also observed.

In Turkey, the mainstream media mostly avoided hate speech and clichés while covering the Armenia-Turkey relations. However, some emotionally contested terms charged with hostility towards Armenians were still used, particularly in the opinion pieces. In the news stories and commentaries the views of the Armenian actors have normally been excluded or under-represented. The Armenian opinions, as represented in Turkish media, were usually taken as already known to be hostile to Turkish interests.

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SECTION I.

THE DYNAMICS OF MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF ARMENIA-TURKEY NORMALIZATION PROCESS IN ARMENIAN MEDIA OUTLETS

1. INTRODUCTION

The research was aimed at identifying the main patterns and the trends of presentation of Armenia-Turkey normalization process from 2008 to 2010 in Armenian media. The dynamics and main modalities of media representation of the key developments in Armenia-Turkey normalization process in 2008-2010 were explored in five media outlets:

- “**Golos Armenii**” - Russian language printed media, mostly supportive of the government, published three times a week in 30-35 daily news pieces in average,
- “**Lragir.am**” - pro-opposition online media with 25-30 daily news pieces in average,
- “**168 Zham**” - pro-opposition printed media published three times a week in 35-45 news pieces in average,
- “**Aravot**” - centrist/pro-opposition printed media published daily in 16 pages,
- “**Azg**” - centrist/pro-government printed media with strong Diaspora connections published daily in 8 pages.

Seven periods were chosen for research on the coverage of Armenia-Turkey relationships in the media between August 2008 and September 2010. The choice of these periods was determined by the developments in the Armenia-Turkey normalization process: months that included important events and significant developments. The following periods were selected:

- **August 20 - September 10, 2008** - “football diplomacy”, starting with the Armenia-Turkey youth football teams match on August 20 and national teams on Sept 6;
- **April 1-30, 2009** - President Obama’s visit to Turkey on April 6-7 and the April 22 announcement about the existence of the road map to normalize Armenia-Turkey relationships;
- **October 1-31, 2009** - before and after the signing of the protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and normalizing Armenia-Turkey relationships (signed on October 10);
- **December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010** - December crisis of the protocols (including the anniversary of Hrant Dink’s murder);
- **March 1-20, 2010** - the discussions on genocide recognition in the US Congress;
- **April 15-30, 2010** - the suspension of protocols;
- **September 1-30, 2010** - The Akhtamar Church service.

The research was carried out using both *quantitative* and *qualitative* methods. The quantitative tables included several criteria:

- number of publications related to Armenia-Turkey relations,
- number of regarding Turkey publications in Armenia in general,
- attitudes towards Turkey (Turks) in neutral, positive or negative terms,
- distribution of the genres,
- sources of publication,
- third parties in the publications regarding Armenia-Turkey normalization process.

Main topics covered in the qualitative material included the following:

- the main trends of media coverage of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process,
- ups and downs in the course of the Armenia-Turkey relationships,
- the position of concrete media outlets regarding the normalization process,
- the most common patterns of views on normalization process,
- terms used to describe the other side,
- interpretation of the role of third parties.

2. GENERAL TRENDS

2.1. Intensity of Coverage

Table 1. The overall number of publications

Time Span	Number of publications on Armenia and Turkey
August 20 - September 10, 2008	279 (9.03%)
April 1-30, 2009	476 (15.41%)
October 1-31, 2009	770 (24.93%)
December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010	598 (19.36%)
March 1-20, 2010	348 (11.26%)
April 15-30, 2010	380 (12.30%)
September 1-30, 2010	235 (7.61%)
All	3088 (100%)

The intensity of the media coverage on Armenia-Turkey relations varied according to different periods included in the research, as well as different media outlets. The overall number of publications over 7 periods consisted of 3088 items (see Table 1), of which 1599 items or a little more than half (53.5%) were related specifically to Armenia-Turkey normalization process (see Table 2).

Table 2. Number of publications specifically related to Armenia-Turkey normalization process

Time Span	Number of publications specifically related to Armenia-Turkey normalization process
August 20 - September 10, 2008	123 (7.69%)
April 1-30, 2009	270 (16.88%)
October 1-31, 2009	464 (29.01%)
December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010	335 (20.95%)
March 1-20, 2010	143 (8.94%)
April 15-30, 2010	185 (11.56%)
September 1-30, 2010	79 (4.94%)
All	1599 (100%)

The most intensive period in all outlets in terms of the number of publications is October 2009 covering the period before and after the signing of the Armenia-Turkey protocols. There are **200** publications in “Azg”, **179** publications in “Golos Armenii”, **164** articles in “Lragir.am”, **147** articles in “168 Zham” and **80** publications in “Aravot”. The total amount of respective items published in October 2009 (770 items) makes around one quarter of all publications (3088 items) (see Table 1).

The next intensive period in all outlets is the period between December 2009 - January 2010 covering the period of the crisis of protocols with 598 items comprising around 20% of overall items (see Table 1), followed by the period covering Obama’s visit to Turkey in April 2009 and the April 22 announcement about the existence of the road map. Only in “Lragir.am” and “Aravot”, the period of suspension of protocols in April 2010 is the third most extensive period.

The least extensive coverage on Armenia-Turkey relations in “Lragir.am” and “Aravot” outlets is the period between August 20 and September 10, 2008 - initiation

of “football diplomacy”. On the other hand, the least extensive coverage in “Golos Armenii”, “Azg” and “168 Zham” outlets is the period between September 1 and September 30, 2010, the period when Akhtamar Church service was going to be initiated.

2.2. Main Topics

In terms of the number of publications dealing with Turkey but not specifically related to the Armenia-Turkey normalization process there are quite a lot of articles making 48.2% of all publications (see Table 3). The publications covered Turkey-Azerbaijan relations, new geopolitical situation after the “5-day” Russian-Georgian war, the Kurdish issue, very few of them the Northern Cyprus issue, and the referendum on constitutional amendments in Turkey. Some publications were related to Turkish-Israeli relations and to the attitudes towards Turkish officials in different countries mainly in a negative way. Turkish-American relations were also covered. All the unrelated publications were substantially from the Turkish sources or other media outlets outside Armenia. “Golos Armenii” was one of the leading outlets in providing news on Turkey from Turkish sources with 121 articles in 7 periods.

Table 3. Numbers of publications related and unrelated to Armenia-Turkey normalization process

Overall number of publications	3088 (100%)
Number of publications related to Armenia-Turkey normalization process	1599 (51.8%)
Number of publications not related to Armenia-Turkey normalization process	1489 (48.2%)

2.3. Genres

The most common genre was news stories with 37% of all publications followed by commentaries (21%) and analysis (18%) (see Table 4). Apart from news stories, “Lragir.am” and “Golos Armenii” were the most analytical media outlets with 5 or 6 commentators providing weekly updates. In “Aravot” and “Azg” interviews was the most popular genre. In “168 Zham” commentaries were the most popular genre.

Table 4. Genres of publications

	news stories	commentaries	analysis	interviews	essay	investigation	other	All
August 20 - September 10, 2008	92	50	70	57	9	2	6	286
April 1-30, 2009	176	99	84	95	13	2	5	474
October 1-31, 2009	300	171	131	125	35	0	5	767
December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010	228	122	108	115	19	4	2	598
March 1-20, 2010	120	72	67	62	22	1	4	348
April 15-30, 2010	146	83	61	53	32	1	4	380
September 1-30, 2010	90	40	46	35	21	3	0	235
All	1152 (37.3%)	637 (20.6%)	567 (18.4%)	542 (17.6%)	151 (4.9%)	13 (0.4%)	26 (0.8%)	3088 (100%)

2.4. Sources

The sources of publications were mainly Armenian or by Armenian journalists reporting from Turkey and/or other countries 76.6% (see Table 5). Turkish sources were the next most popular (11.9%) and sources from other countries (significantly from Russia, 11.5%) - the third most popular ones reprinted or mentioned in Armenian publications (see Table 5).

Table 5. Sources of publications

	Sources from Armenia	Media from Turkey	Sources from other countries	All
August 20 - September 10, 2008	224	29	26	279
April 1-30, 2009	368	42	66	476
October 1-31, 2009	588	82	100	770
December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010	498	59	41	598
March 1-20, 2010	246	49	53	348
April 15-30, 2010	290	50	40	380
September 1-30, 2010	151	57	29	237
All	2365 (76.6%)	368 (11.9%)	355 (11.5%)	3088 (100%)

2.5. Subjects

The most popular subject was foreign policy (56.3%) followed by history (12.6%) and internal policy (10.3%) (see Table 6).

Table 6. Subjects of publications

	foreign policy	history	internal policy	economy	culture	social issues	human dimension /interest story	other	All
August 20 - September 10, 2008	177	16	27	20	23	7	3	6	279
April 1-30, 2009	302	68	35	45	9	6	4	7	476
October 1-31, 2009	478	44	96	70	34	11	8	24	765
December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010	387	46	75	40	10	12	14	14	598
March 1-20, 2010	152	76	34	25	9	7	13	31	347
April 15-30, 2010	161	110	36	21	21	5	19	14	387
September 1-30, 2010	80	28	14	14	47	13	15	25	236
All	1737 (56.3%)	388 (12.6%)	317 (10.3%)	235 (7.6%)	153 (5.0%)	61 (2.0%)	76 (2.5%)	121 (4.0%)	3088 (100%)

2.6. Positive/Negative/Neutral Attitudes

Negative attitudes were almost three times more numerous than positive ones (12% vs. 4%) (see Table 7).

Table 7. Number of publications on Armenia and Turkey in general (including those on normalization process) by attitudes

	All, of which:	Neutral	Negative	Positive
August 20 - September 10, 2008	279	222	30	27
April 1-30, 2009	476	397	56	23
October 1-31, 2009	770	675	73	24
December 1, 2009 - January 31, 2010	598	527	61	10
March 1-20, 2010	348	280	54	14
April 15-30, 2010	380	309	58	13
September 1-30, 2010	237	182	36	17
All	3088 (100%)	2592 (84%)	368 (12%)	128 (4%)

While most of the publications had neutral character, the trends of negative and positive attitudes towards Turkey and Turks varied in different periods. However, the absolute number of negative attitudes was higher in every single period in three media outlets: “Lragir.am”, “Aravot” and “168 Zham”. The only period when the differences between negative and positive attitudes were relatively small (10.8% vs. 9.7%, correspondingly) was the period of football diplomacy. But, on the other hand, in two media outlets - “Golos Armenii” and “Azg”, during the same period there were higher positive attitudes towards Turkey and Turks. Interestingly, these are the two pro-government media outlets trying to support Armenia-Turkey normalization process initiated by the authorities.

However, starting from the following period of announcing the road map of Armenia-Turkey normalization process on April 22, 2009 (only two days before April 24th - Armenian Genocide Memorial Day), the negative attitudes prevailed in all five media outlets (15.3% of negative ones vs. 3.4% positive ones) Had it been announced at some other time of the year, most probably, the attitudes would not have been as negative as they were at that time of the year.

The most fervent negative narratives came from the circles having a reputation of nationalists (parties such as ARF “Dashnaksutyun”, analysts, think tanks, NGOs) and Mountainous Karabagh. The motivation behind negative attitudes among the nationalists was pretty much clear. There were several factors supporting it, such as announcing about the existence of road map on the eve of April 24th thus “betraying” the “Armenian Cause”, nothing mentioned about the recognition of Armenian Genocide in the protocols and, finally, not really clear legal mechanisms for establishment of diplomatic relations in a way that it was undertaken.

The negative attitudes coming from Mountainous Karabagh were due to the vast numbers of articles indicating the connection between Mountainous Karabagh peace process and Armenia-Turkey normalization process, even though there were no such links even in the protocols signed in October 2009. However, people in Mountainous Karabagh did not feel confident enough in terms of their security that Armenia-Turkey

normalization process wouldn't force them (through the authorities in Armenia) to go for certain unilateral concessions in Mountainous Karabagh peace process.

The positive attitudes were presented mostly by the ruling coalition parties (Republican Party of Armenia, "Bargavatch Hayastan", "Orinats Yerkir") intellectuals and academics, although historians, on the other hand, were mainly raising the Genocide issue. The main opposition force - Armenian National Congress - even though criticized the approach undertaken by the authorities towards Armenia-Turkey normalization process, voiced mainly neutral attitudes generally supporting the *rapprochement* process between the two nations.

3. MEDIA COVERAGE AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE ARMENIA-TURKEY NORMALIZATION PROCESS

3.1. Football Diplomacy

The main trend in the publications was the post-war regional situation after 5-day war in Georgia and the new geopolitical reality. During this period media outlets started to describe different aspects regarding Armenia-Turkey relations in the context of Turkey's initiative to create "Caucasian Platform of Stability" and after the announcement of "Football Diplomacy" between Turkey and Armenia. This was the only period when the positive attitudes towards Turkey and Turks were higher in pro-government "Golos Armenii" and "Azg" outlets.

Different patterns of normalization process were presented which could be grouped according to economic, political, socio-cultural and regional aspects.

Mainly positive articles were published to indicate the economic efficiency of the normalization process. In the publications titled "Open up to Your Neighbors" the commentator stated: "We made our own calculations that we would like to share with the public. Any train can reach from Samsun on the Black Sea coast of Turkey to Yerevan in 34 hours, to Tbilisi in 36 hours and to Baku in 49 hours. From Mersin, which is on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, it will take 37, 39 and 52 hours respectively. That much simple. The railroad can become functional in few hours, once a political decision is made." ("Lragir.am", August 25, 2008). Another example was the news that Armenia will supply electricity to Turkey starting from 2009, ("Lragir.am", September 10, 2008).

In "168 Zham", Armenia-Turkey relations were also widely covered. They also described various socio-economic and political expectations from Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. "This is not only football game: said ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" party representative"; "They are going for a business" ("168 Zham", August 20, 2008). Other articles described the future opportunities or benefits from Armenia-Turkey normalization process in terms of economic development. Several publications on regional developments were also covered, such as: "Russia favors opening of Armenia-Turkey border in the wake of 5 days war in Georgia" (September 1, 2008), indicating to the role of Russia as an important actor behind this process.

Political aspect of the process was also mainly described in positive terms such as: "Today a situation has occurred regarding our relations from which nobody benefits, on the contrary, many suffer. I am sure that there is no meaning and need for being eternal rivals; it is obvious that the question of improvement of relations has matured, and from this step will benefit both the Turkish and Armenian societies. If you remember, the Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan said a few months ago that in this period the doors are ajar for a new dialogue ("Lragir.am", August 25, 2008), or "The best solution is to establish diplomatic relations, we are a bridge between Armenia and Turkey" referring to the Armenian community in Turkey ("Aravot", September 4, 2008).

President Sargsyan speaking of the normalization process: "I am sure we can have such a dialogue if there is a wish, and the visit of President Gul to Armenia will

promote these positive tendencies ... We may have innumerable problems but we will be unable to solve them unless we speak to each other like civilized states, unless our countries have adequate political relations” (August 25, 2008).

The position of “Golos Armenii” was mostly pragmatic and, sometimes, positive. They wrote about Armenian official position, statements made by the authorities clearly pushing through the normalization process between Armenians and Turks. “It is obvious that there is a need to address the issue of improving relations, and this move will be beneficial to both Turkish and Armenian societies. That is why Armenia is ready to establish relations with Turkey without any preconditions (“Golos Armenii”, August 26, 2008).

Another statement, which is perhaps the most positive in the outlets, was provided by an artist indicating the high level of enthusiasm among some in Armenia at the beginning of the Armenian-Turkey rapprochement: “I am already 100 years old. I witnessed the terrible crime by the leaders of Ottoman Turkey in 1915 but I strongly believe that the enmity between two our countries cannot continue forever. We need to find a way of mutual agreement” (“Golos Armenii”, August 30, 2008).

At this stage some commentators who later criticized the normalization process evaluated the football diplomacy positively, such as the one by ex-foreign minister Oskanyan in “The Caucasus Moment” (“Lragir.am”, August 24, 2008): “This [football diplomacy] offers an opportunity for these two neighbors to discuss common security challenges and pave the way for a region of peace.”

Opposition view on the normalization process was covered both in “Lragir.am” and “Aravot” in positive terms particularly in the publication under the title “The opposition calls off the rally” (“Aravot”, August 29, 2008) and “Congress [ANC] gives supporters and government ten days to rest” (“Lragir.am”, August 29, 2008). “The Congress postpones the rally of September 5 by one week, which is determined by the situation in the region, the match Armenia vs. Turkey on September 6, the Turkish tourists expected to arrive in Armenia, and the worry not to allow any provocation and not to jeopardize the reputation of Armenia”.

In socio-cultural aspect, Armenian Genocide was mentioned in the publications in relation to “football diplomacy”. The commentary by the Director of Armenian Genocide Institute-Museum Demoyan was widely used in all outlets: “Exposition headlined “Armenian Sports in the Ottoman Empire” opens at the Museum Institute of the Armenian Genocide which will last till September 15. It includes about 70 photos, documents, periodicals which tell the history of the Armenian sport clubs and football teams in the Ottoman Empire until 1915” (September 2, 2008).

On the other hand, the nationalist sector of the political spectrum were against the re-establishment of the relations and the opening of borders between Armenia and Turkey without recognition of Genocide. There were also several negative pieces of publications referring to the removal of Ararat from the emblem of Armenian Football Federation in “Lragir.am”: “Ararat to Armenians and Armenians to Ararat” (September 6, 2009) and “Capitulation or diplomatic great move” and “As if we are meeting our lost brother (ARF “Dashnaktsutyun”)” in “Aravot” (September 4, 2008) and “Azg” (September 5, 2008).

While similar positions were covered also in “Azg”, it also published articles about the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. “The terrible panic in Baku began on the day when it was announced about the normalization of relations and Armenia-Turkey “Football diplomacy”. This was the start of crisis between two brother states” (“Azg”, September 10, 2008).

To sum up, the statements and approaches towards the start of Armenia-Turkey normalization process were highly polarized in Armenian society. Starting from this period and throughout all following periods covering normalization process, Armenia-Turkey relationships were vastly manipulated in the internal political processes, and certain political forces turned this subject into an argument used significantly for domestic political discourse.

3.2. Road Map

In all media outlets as usually in April, most of the publications were about Armenian Genocide, calling for recognition of genocide together with articles urging Obama to use the G-word voiced both by Diaspora Armenians and locals, some historical remarks (about the Adana events of 1909), Obama’s visit to Turkey and possibility of Genocide recognition by USA. The main trend of this period was the public reaction towards the Road map.

In “Aravot” there were publications about the Adana events of 1909: “Remembering Adana massacre 100th anniversary”. Other topics covered in “Aravot”: prospects of opening the borders mainly but not entirely in positive terms; impact of Armenia-Turkey normalization process on internal affairs with the possibility of ARF “Dashnaksutyun” leaving the ruling coalition; demanding disclosing the road map (in the period after April 22, 2009). One other characteristics of “Aravot” was relatively much space given to ARF “Dashnaksutyun” representatives, their views on the road map and Armenia-Turkey relations in general.

In “Lragir.am” road map was largely criticized because it was on the eve of April 24 and because nobody knew the details. All political forces mainly criticized it with negative attitude reflected in articles with titles such as: “We need to know what is behind the road map”, “the night diplomacy” and “stab in the back” (April 27, 2009, April 30, 2009).

In “Golos Armenii” (April 2, 2009) the author expressed an optimistic opinion about Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey, underlining, that “up to now, he has done all what he promised, and on April 24 he is going to use the G-word in his speech”. The entire article was mainly positive towards America and full of critics towards Turkey in its activities trying to halt recognition of Armenian Genocide: “Theatrical performance played dishonestly.”

The most positive article of this period was published in “Azg” indicating that there are positive opinions on Armenia-Turkey normalization process even in Armenian Diaspora. Russian businessman Ara Abrahamyan mentioned that “opening of the borders with Turkey will bring prosperity to Armenia” (“Azg”, April 25, 2009).

Most of the articles, however, criticized the Road map and demanded more transparent relations and negotiations to understand the pros and contras of it after the announcement of the existence of such Road map. The discourse instantly

changed from more neutral to negative and critical after the disclosure of the road map. It was obvious that even in pragmatic or pro-governmental Armenian media outlets articles turned to become more negative.

3.3. Protocols

This period was the most intensive period for all media outlets, with the maximum number of publications covering the period before and after the signing of the Armenia-Turkey protocols on October 10, 2009.

There were various “pro” and “contra” arguments during this period. The supporters of the “pro” argument were among Government structures, pro-governmental organizations and some media. They argued for the signing of the protocols without preconditions, to establish deeper cooperation for economic development and increasing the level of trade. On the other hand, the supporters of the “against” argument were among opposition, NGOs and other Media. Their line was the following: recognition of the Armenian Genocide, opening of the borders between Armenia and Turkey, reparations and etc.

Many counter-arguments came from Diaspora, including media, NGOs and other structures, as well as some Armenian political parties. They were against the protocols with mainly the following argumentation: recognizing Turkish territorial integrity before Turkey recognizes Armenian Genocide is wrong, the statement in the protocols on the establishment of historical commission is a terrible blunder, and finally there are clear links voiced by Turkish officials between Armenia-Turkey normalization process and Mountainous Karabagh issue.

This period could metaphorically be labeled as the first nail in the coffin of “football diplomacy”. In “Aravot”, for instance, if the number of publications with negative attitudes was equal with positive ones in the period of “football diplomacy” and twice more in the “road map” period, in the period of “protocols” it was three times larger.

Most of the positive publications were related to the economic perspectives and insights from inside Turkey covering different aspects of life in five articles presented by “Aravot”'s commentator. Some Diaspora voices raised a few positive statements, one of which insisting the process is about the future and not the past: “It is clear that this process does not mean to forget the past and to question the fact and the importance of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide” (“Lragir.am”, October 10, 2009). Several interviews with representatives of authorities also highlighted the positive aspects of the protocols.

However, the main pattern of publications was negative including publications from Turkish media sources criticizing the normalization process. Again wide coverage of ARF “Dashnaktsutyun” was provided. One of the titles was quite remarkable: “The only salvation for Armenians is with tanks” (October 7, 2009).

“Lragir.am” and “Azg” mainly presented negative aspects of the process and protocols in particular identifying the establishment of the historical commission and its possible implications on the further recognition of Armenian Genocide as a major blow. Position of the ARF “Dashnaktsutyun” party was widely covered in this regard.

Another example is a letter from US based Armenian Diaspora organization - the Zoryan Institute in the US, director of which urged President Sargsyan not to sign the Protocols: "The Protocols for establishing diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, although intended to help normalize relations between the two countries, raise serious questions about the process, and contain pitfalls" ("Azg", October 2, 2009).

ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" rally organized against the protocols was widely covered in the outlets. The main demand of the rally was to demand the resignation of the President if the protocols were to be ratified. The cooperation of eleven political parties against the protocols was also covered in numerous publications.

"Lragir.am"'s commentators were also doubtful about the process presenting publications titled "The shine of 30 silver pieces" (October 2, 2009) or "Turkey will apologize" (October 7, 2009). Some other publications were entitled as: "This is our final Sardarapat" (October 9, 2009), "Armenia-Turkey Protocols to be burnt" (October 7, 2009), "Genocide forgotten", "Core Values are Not Commodities" and "This is Duplicity, Not Diplomacy" (October 9, 2009).

After signing of the Protocols negativity towards the Armenia-Turkey normalization process continued to take up major space in both media outlets. One of the commentators of "Lragir.am" raised the *Turkofobia* issue: "Discussions on the Armenia-Turkey protocols revealed an interesting topic that is constantly being mentioned, but is not elaborated until the end - Turkofobia. It is in the air, but few people say about it, apparently because of sensitivity about the subject" (October 19, 2009). An opposition (Armenian National Congress) critic was targeted mainly to two aspects: setup of the commission of historians and connections with Mountainous Karabagh conflict resolution process ("Lragir.am", October 13, 2009).

"Golos Armenii" continued clearly supporting official position by indicating that the normalization process did not endanger the recognition of Genocide. Moreover it indicated that Armenian were ready to normalize relations between two countries without any pre-conditions. Economic aspects and benefits were also outlined: "According to the most pessimistic forecasts, as a result of opening Armenia-Turkey border Armenia's GDP will grow by 3%, while exports will grow by 30%" (October 3, 2009). However, potential negative aspects from the opening of the border were also discussed indicating that Armenian economy is not ready to compete with Turkish counterparts in terms of supporting national production and increase of the quality of products (October 3, 2009).

"168 Zham" also indicated the negative implications of the possible opening of border in an interview with former Prime-Minister Bagratyan indicating, that "Oligarchs, who are dangerous for Armenian economy will cooperate and work with Turkish businessmen, which is not beneficial for Armenians in general. Turks will work with Armenian oligarchs" (October 10, 2009).

To sum up, the most ardent characteristic of this period was the intensity of the information on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Both positive and negative attitudes were present and were discussed in this period, describing the main benefits and worries coming from Protocols.

3.4. Crisis of the Protocols

Different options for ratification were discussed in different media outlets. However, the main trend of the discussions in significant number of publications was directed to pointing out the impossibility of ratification of protocols. The main argument was often supported by the stance of Turkey to connect the rapprochement with the Mountainous Karabagh peace process.

The main focus of the publications was the hearing in Armenian Constitutional Court on the question whether the protocols correspond to the Constitution. Different events around this issue were described in the news and commentaries in "Lragir.am": "The ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" and 13 other parties organized a picket in front of the Constitutional Court against the Armenia-Turkey protocols demanding from the Constitutional Court to declare them anti-Constitutional" (January 14, 2010).

After the decision by the Constitutional Court stating that the Protocols correspond to Constitution several publications in "Lragir.am" presented commentaries highlighting mainly the goal of those opposing the ratification: "The maximum aim was that the Constitutional Court could decide that the protocols were not in accord with the Republic of Armenia Constitution. The minimum aim was that the Constitutional Court decision would create grounds for future reservations. We reached our goal. No Karabagh issue, genocide refusal and recognition of the Armenia-Turkey border can be included in this document. The Constitutional Court decision set these affirmations. But the Armenian interest is not fully protected with the help of these reservations", said one of the ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" members (January 15, 2010).

Main narrative in "Golos Armenii" and "Azg" was developed around the fact that Armenia-Turkey relations were not only inter-state relations, but also an issue of National Security of Armenia. "In the current situation, when Turkey constantly reminded of the conditions of normalization process at various levels, Armenia should take a firm position and put forward its own terms ("Azg", December 4, 2009). But, on the other hand, some politicians in Armenia raised a concern that ratification of the protocols with existing conditions can have tragic impact on Armenia ("168 Zham", December 17, 2009).

The main arguments against ratification were Turkey's position on Mountainous Karabagh peace process and its connection with the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. After the Constitutional Court's decision confirming that Armenia-Turkey protocols correspond to Armenian Constitution, it was argued that Genocide issues, Mountainous Karabagh peace process and recognition of the borders were not related to the issues outlined in the protocols. "These issues are different from the ones in the Protocols and requires new agreements" ("Golos Armenii", January 14, 2010).

In "Aravot" also vast amount of publications focused on ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" statements and actions in and around Constitutional Court decision. The publications were mainly presented in the genre of interviews on the decision of the Constitutional Court not only with ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" members but also another nationalistically oriented politicians from "Zharangutyun" Party and others (January 20, 2010). There were also several articles exploring the negative effects opening of the border might have on Armenian economy (January 19, 2010). The ruling Republican Party members start indicating that Turkey betrayed the process (January 22, 2010).

The approach of the ruling coalition towards ratification of protocols was characterized in the following statement: “Even if Turkey refuses to ratify the document, Armenia will have an opportunity to draw the public attention to the Turkey’s destructive policy” (“Golos Armenii”, January 21, 2010).

Summing up, we can say that during this period different options for ratification were discussed in all media outlets. However, the main trend of the discussions in significant number of publications was directed to pointing out the impossibility of ratification of protocols. The Protocols were criticized and during this period discourse began instantly it’s changing from more neutral to negative and critical after the declared Turkey’s position on Mountainous Karabagh peace process and its connection with the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey.

3.5. Genocide Recognition Resolution in the US Congress

The media coverage of this period was to a high degree devoted to the issue of the resolution to recognize Armenian Genocide in the US Congress. One of the most appropriate characteristics for this period was probably the term “Déjà vu” used by “Lragir.am”’s commentator describing discussions on the Armenian Genocide recognition resolution in the US Congress. However, after the US House Foreign Relations Committee successfully passed House Resolution 252 with a vote of 23 to 22 there were several publications about the importance of such resolution condemning Armenian Genocide (March 12, 2010).

This was also the period of activation of the Turkish lobby in the United States. After the US House Foreign Relations Committee successfully passed House Resolution 252, it raised new hopes for the recognition of the Genocide among some Armenians. Media outlets were full of different articles regarding the issue of activation of Turkish lobby, particularly in “Golos Armenii” and “Azg”. “March increased efforts of the Turkish diplomacy, which is aimed at preventing the adoption of the U.S. Congress resolution on the Armenian Genocide recognition in Ottoman Empire in 1915. It seems, this has become a tradition in Turkey” (“Golos Armenii”, March 4, 2010).

Interestingly, there were also quite a few articles from Turkish sources blaming US for this destructive move, such as: “Davutoglu: US interference complicated the normalization process” (March 5, 2010). After the Swedish parliament approved a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire and Catalonian recognition, Prime Minister Erdogan’s and President Gul’s concerns were reprinted in “Lragir.am” and “Golos Armenii”: “The Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, in an interview with BBC, stated that the adoption of the Armenian genocide resolution in different parliaments harms first of all Armenia. According to him, Armenia has to get rid of the sponsorship of Diaspora, as well as its supporter countries, U.S., France and Russia. According to Erdogan, in Turkey, currently 170 thousand Armenians are living, 70 thousand of which are Turkish citizens. He said, if necessary, he will propose to the remaining 100 thousand to leave the country because he is not obliged to take care of them” (January 17, 2010).

An interesting article was published in “Golos Armenii” revealing some aspects of the image of the “Turk” in the conservative nationalist discourse, which sprang up against the political background of that period: “In this regard, all talks about civilized twenty-

first century and "new Turk", who is completely different, can be called hypocritical or use a mild expression. And Armenians should not be surprised at witnessing another resurgence of the true essence of a Turk" ("Golos Armenii", March 19, 2010).

In "Aravot" the editor described Armenian Genocide issue as a gambling card in the hands of third countries against Turkey, particularly Israel and United States identifying the resolution in The US House Foreign Relations Committee as a matter of US-Turkish and Turkish-Israeli relationships rather than a matter of importance for Armenians (January 6, 2010).

"168 Zham", apart from Genocide recognition discussions and resolutions in US, Sweden and Catalonia, published quite a few commentaries from Turkey urging normalizing Armenia-Turkey relations without participation of third countries such as the US exploiting resolution 252 against Turkey (March 4, 2010, March 6, 2010). Also Turkish-American relations were explored together with the comparisons between the Armenian term for Armenian Genocide - Mets Yeghern - Obama used in his speech of April 24, 2009 and the term Genocide (March 4, 2010).

During this same period "Golos Armenii" reported on the initiative of the Bulgarian "Order, Law and Justice" party, which, days before the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Bulgaria, submitted a formal statement condemning the Armenian Genocide to the Parliament. ("Golos Armenii", March 19, 2010).

3.6. The Suspension of Protocols

Apart from numerous publications regarding Armenian Genocide commemoration ceremonies across Armenian Diaspora and Armenia in all three media outlets, there were also publications reprinted from Turkish media calling for Turks to commemorate the events of April 24, 1915": "On April 24, in Istanbul, Turkish intellectuals are going to hold a manifestation dedicated to the memory of 1915 victims", ("Aravot", April 24, 2010).

"Lragir.am" published another statement originally posted at <http://buacihemiz.org>: "Over 70 Turkish intellectuals issued a statement which in particular runs that all 1,5-2 million Armenians were living in Turkey and 'they were the grocer in our neighborhood, our tailor, our goldsmith, our carpenter, our shoemaker, our farmhand, our millwright, our classmate, our teacher, our officer, our private, our deputy, our historian, our composer... Our friend, our next-door neighbors and our companion in bad times'" (April 24, 2010).

The final nail in the coffin of "football diplomacy" was provided by the statements of Armenian officials and President Serzh Sargsyan in the speech published on April 24: "For a whole year, Turkey's senior officials have not spared public statements in the language of preconditions. For a whole year, Turkey has done everything to protract time and fail the process. Hence, our conclusion and position are straightforward... and we consider the current phase of normalization exhausted" (April 24, 2010).

Azerbaijan's interests and perspectives on future relations with Turkey were also presented in "Lragir.am". For example, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan addressing

the Turkish parliament said that: “Turkey has never abandoned the Azerbaijani interests in its negotiations with Armenia” (April 26, 2010).

“Aravot” published series of report on Armenian communities in Turkey before 1915. After the official suspension of Protocols by Armenia, “Aravot” provided mainly positive responses about the suspension blaming Turkey for that matter: “The ball is in Turkey’s court” was the most popular sentence in many publications. Another remarkable proverb was often used in different interviews: “The Turk will remain Turk”. ARF “Dashnaktsutyun” rally was also reported referring to the terms they used: “Death to Turks” (April 24, 2010).

“168 Zham” touched on the question whether President Obama will use the G-word and its implications both for Turks and Armenians (April 15, 2010, April 22, 2010). There were several stories from inside Turkey unrelated to normalization process where Turks were presented in negative terms: the Kurdish issue (April 29, 2010), Cyprus conflict (April 10, 2010), Turks being treated badly in other countries (throwing eggs to the faces of an official in Lebanon (April 20, 2010). After April 22 there were articles entitled: “the death of football diplomacy” or “the end of protocols”. However, there were also articles from Turkey, such as the one by the intellectuals calling for commemoration of the Genocide (April 24, 2010).

“Golos Armenii” also published articles regarding Armenian Genocide commemoration ceremonies on April 24, official statements, especially in USA, and a possible Genocide recognition by the US Senate. As a reaction on the statements from Turkey about progress in Mountainous Karabagh peace process, Armenian media and government authorities gave direct message to Ankara, such as: “The Turkish side tried to hold discussions on the Karabagh issue, our answer is the same as before: the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations cannot be linked with the settlement of the Mountainous Karabagh problem” (“Golos Armenii”, April 15, 2010).

The fierce criticism towards the remarks by Turkish officials to link together Armenia-Turkey normalization process and Mountainous Karabagh peace process was expressed in the following statement in one of the publications in “Golos Armenii” “By the way, it would be better to freeze the Mountainous Karabagh process, if Turkey and Azerbaijan are so eager to tie two processes together. In the end, what are we losing?” (“Golos Armenii”, April 20, 2010).

An interesting article on the opening of the memorial (April 4, 2010, Tbilisi, Georgia) plaque in the honor of the perpetrator of the Armenian Genocide, “the bloody” Jemal Pasha, one of the organizers of the Armenian Genocide was published in “Golos Armenii” (“Golos Armenii”, April 15, 2010).

Other articles entitled such as “Let’s negotiate with Turkey, but without any preconditions”, (“Azg”, April 20, 2010), “Vardan Oskanyan: Authorities have chosen for us the most adverse conditions” (“Azg”, April 27, 2010) and “Armenians are playing chess, while Turks are playing theatre” (“Azg”, April 22, 2010) were among the interesting ones in “Azg”.

The main characteristics of this period can be publications regarding Armenian Genocide commemoration ceremonies across Armenian Diaspora and Armenia. And

discussions on ratification of the protocols became more negative and protocols were suspended.

3.7. Akhtamar Church Service

Most publications during this period were related to the re-opening of the Akhtamar Church. For the last two years Armenian public discussed that Turkey was going to renovate and re-open the Akhtamar Church. However, by the time of the official ceremony Armenian media initiated discussions on the issue of participation or restraint from visiting church service in Van. The discussion became more serious after the Holy Etchmiadzin's announcement to decline the invitation to participate in the service.

An intense debate among Armenians on attending or boycotting or attend Akhtamar church service in Van was the main topic of publications on Armenia-Turkey relationships during the last period of monitoring in all media outlets researched. All of them provided both pro and contra arguments about the Surb Khach church service. "Lragir.am" provided some publications from Diaspora in the US calling for Armenians not to participate in the church service if the cross was not placed on the top of the church: "Articles exposing the Turkey's sinister plans did little to settle the controversy. Making matters worse, the Holy See of Etchmiadzin and the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem announced plans to send representatives to the Akhtamar church, although the Catholicosate of Cilicia declined to participate" (September 22, 2010).

In turn Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan's view on Akhtamar Surb Khach (Saint Cross) Church, were also provided expecting tolerant attitude towards Turkey too: "The permission of Turkey to hold annual masses there proves Turkey's being tolerant. Previous governments of Turkey have never taken up such a step (September 16, 2010).

There were no statements by Armenian officials on this issue, while the views of many intellectuals and civic activists were presented in "Lragir.am".

The role of Switzerland in the Armenia-Turkey normalization process was presented with the vice-president of Switzerland stating that the Armenia-Turkey process cannot remain half done and Switzerland is determined to move the process forward (September 30, 2010).

"168 Zham" provided lots of news from turkey on referendum amendments (September 9, 2010), reconstruction of churches and building relationships with neighbors (September 11, 2010) in contrast to the number of articles on Akhtamar Church issue, the main argument of which was to analyze who won in this situation: Armenians or Turks? However, "168 Zham" also included live-report from Van in rather neutral terms.

"Aravot" continued busting "Football Diplomacy" as a lesson learnt. Interviews with pro and contra viewpoints were published at the time of Akhtamar Church service (September 8, 2010, September 10, 2010). In series of essays published by a Turkish journalist on Armenians living in Turkey and his own visit to Armenia added some positivity in the stalemate created in the wake of "football diplomacy".

In “Golos Armenii” one of the articles was titled: “To go or not to go to Van”. The author was analyzing the situation saying that Armenian authorities didn’t want Armenians to participate at the service but at the same time it was clear that not only Turkish Armenians are going to participate in the Liturgy, but also many representatives from Diaspora. Another statement is also indicative, underlying that Armenians don’t believe in real changes happening in Turkey: “The cause is obvious: after two years of playing “football diplomacy” the Turks, in addition to continuing the blockade of Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic or any other kind of relations with Armenia, continuing to maintain a pro-Azerbaijani stance on the issue of Mountainous Karabagh, but also threatened that they would exile “thousands of Armenians” from Turkey” (“Azg”, September 3, 2010).

“Azg” also discussed this issue with the following interesting findings such as: “Akhtamar Church service on the 19th of September will take place without Cross” (“Azg”, September 4, 2010). And in “Golos Armenii”: “The ratification process of the Armenia-Turkey protocols failed” (September 16, 2010).

We can say that during this period in all media outlets began an intense debate among Armenians on attending or boycotting Akhtamar church service in Van. All of them provided both pro and contra arguments about the Surb Khach church service and its influence on future relations with Turkey.

3.8. Main Discursive Patterns of Coverage of Armenia-Turkey Relations

Summing up the media coverage of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process from 2008-2010, as presented in this paper, it can be argued that two main discursive patterns existed in Armenian mass-media. One can be summarized by the statement “Turks remain Turks”, repeated so often by the critics of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement that it has become a common “trade mark”. This discourse is based on the assumption that the Turkey has always been and will always remain hostile to Armenia, any other messages coming from Turkish side are pure rhetoric designed to conceal the real attitude of Turkey. Therefore, engaging in normalization process with Turkey is a dangerous mistake. Any attempt of rapprochement with Turkey, this discourse argues, goes against the interests of Armenia.

Another discursive pattern, which is opposing the pattern “Turks remain Turks”, can be summarized by the formula “it is 21st century, therefore borders should be opened and dialogue should be established”. This discourse, stresses that the realities of the modern world in 21st century are very different from the realities of the early 20th century, and Turkey has been changed significantly, therefore Armenia can and should attempt to establish normal relations with Turkey. This discourse, which focuses on the positive sides of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process, stresses the necessity to “look forward” rather than focus on the past.

It is important to remember that the discourse patterns described above cannot be ascribed to particular media outlets, particular authors, or particular political sympathies. Often these two discourses are intertwined within the publications within the same media outlet, the positions of the same political force or even articles by the same author. The course of events in the process of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process as well as certain symbolic dates can influence the media field, leading to a domination of one discourse over the other at different times. These discursive patterns are also not entirely identifiable with certain political

orientation. While, apparently, supporters of nationalist parties may in general be more prone to the influence of the first discourse, while supporters of political forces, which position themselves as liberals, can be more prone to the second one, the picture is far from being black and white. Thus, both pro-government and pro-opposition media outlets display the influence of both of these discourses, depending on the internal and external political context, or individual views of certain political figures or journalists.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Armenian media extensively covered Armenia-Turkey normalization process during the identified periods. Armenia-Turkey relations were often given higher importance not only compared to other foreign affairs issues but also compared to the news of domestic character and internal politics. The normalization process was widely covered not only in its political aspects, but also economic, regional, cultural and international perspectives. Relatively few numbers of analytical pieces (essays, analyses) as compared to other genres such as news stories, commentaries and interviews was another characteristic among the five media outlets.

The main actors in reporting the Armenia-Turkey normalization process were Armenia and Turkey (Armenians and Turks). Other actors mostly mentioned in the publications were the USA (the West), Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The main focus through which Armenia-Turkey relations were analyzed was foreign policy. However, issues related to internal politics and history were among the aspects most often highlighted by the media. Pro-government/centrist newspapers tended to pay more attention to the Armenia-Turkey normalization than pro-opposition media. This may be in part explained by the fact that pro-opposition outlets focused more on internal politics and activities of the opposition, thus leaving less space for the coverage of the normalization process.

Attitudes to the normalization process to a high extent followed the changing dynamics of the political context, both internal and external. If in the first period the publications covered topics related to different aspects of Armenia-Turkey normalization process such as political, economic, socio-cultural and regional impacts of the possible rapprochement in some sort of optimistic picture, in the following periods this optimism and early belief in positive change shifted towards strictly political dimension and discussions of the question on what 'we lose' rather than 'what we both win'.

Attitudes to the Armenia-Turkey normalization process also reflected the political stance of the media outlets with regard to internal Armenian politics, particularly attitudes to government and opposition. In the opposition outlets many materials that were cautious or critical with regard to the normalization process were published from the early stages of the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement process. In case of pro-government sources there were more positive publications in the beginning of the initiation of "football diplomacy" with negative attitudes substantially outnumbering positive ones after the crisis of the protocols in December 2009. However, the attitudes of pro-government media changed significantly throughout the process of normalization: these changes reflected the changes in the approaches of pro-government political forces (including coalition and other parties) and structures (NGOs, think-tanks) towards the normalization process gravitating from generally positive or neutral tone to a more negative one. Another characteristic of the publications was the startling influence of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process on the internal political life in Armenia largely described in different media outlets. Journalists representing both pro-government and opposition media did not hesitate to comment analyses and often manipulate normalization process for the sake of

certain internal political gains. The main focus of publications sometimes was not necessarily the process but internal political developments affected by the process.

The symbolic-historical aspects, such as coincidence of rapprochement moves with certain historical dates of large symbolic significance, have strongly influenced media coverage. Thus, while many commentators (including even independent analysts and non-partisan experts) were trying to provide more positive picture of normalization process before and shortly after “football diplomacy”, very quickly this attitude was changed after the announcement of road map, especially because of the date chosen for the announcement, being close to April 24. Many negative attitudes towards the normalization process as well as Turkey in general were observed in sources coming from Diaspora, particularly in the period of April 2009 urging Obama to use G-word in his speech on April 24. A large part of the Armenian public found it unacceptable that the road map was presented on the eve of Armenian Genocide commemoration date on April 24. Many marked it as an outcome of “night diplomacy” because the announcement was made late in the evening of April 22. For many it was a clear “stab in the back”, particularly because no remark on the recognition of Genocide was made in the road map.

While negative and neutral attitudes dominated the coverage, positive attitudes were also quite visible, particularly in publications with sources coming from Turkey. Moreover, the existence of a certain type of discourse can be observed, which stresses the changes in Turkey during recent years and praises Turkish liberal intellectuals for being open to the Armenian point of view, and defending the rights of Armenian minority in Turkey. This discourse was particularly apparent during the initial period of initiation of “football diplomacy”. Besides, this discourse is also obvious, among such publications were reports mentioning commemoration of genocide in Istanbul by Turkish intellectuals.

Within the media coverage on Armenia-Turkey relations two most common discursive patterns can be identified: one that rejects the possibility of a lasting normalization of relations with Turkey and views attempts of dialogue as potentially dangerous for Armenia, and one that focuses on the necessity to advance the dialogue with Turkey. The first pattern is based on the assumption that Turkey has always been and will always remain hostile to Armenia, any other messages coming from Turkish side are pure rhetoric designed to conceal the real attitude of Turkey, therefore attempts of dialogue with Turkey could be dangerous for Armenia. The second pattern stresses the changes in modern Turkey and argues that establishing normal relations is both desirable and realistic.

SECTION II.

A SURVEY ON TURKISH MEDIA COVERAGE OF ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIA-TURKEY RAPPROCHEMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of the research is to map out the main patterns and trends of representation in the mainstream Turkish media of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process from 2008 to 2010. The research seeks to show the dynamics of media representation of the key developments in the Armenia-Turkey normalization process between 2008 and 2010.

In this report, we shall outline the findings of our quantitative and qualitative surveys of the coverage of the seven selected periods between 2008 and 2010 in five selected outlets. In the quantitative report, we shall firstly introduce the five outlets, explicating our selection criteria, including the political orientation and circulation of each of the outlets. The analysis moves on to compare the selected outlets regarding the sources, genre, frequency, subjects, stimulants, contexts, third parties and the positive or negative nature of the contents of the coverage of the Armenia-Turkey relations. The quantitative report is finalized by outlining the analytic conclusions of the reported data.

Our qualitative analysis concentrates on the selected news reports and opinion pieces of the same sequences. We have considered the news reports regarding the identity and the presentation of the key actors. The qualitative analysis also examines the reports regarding the bias, including the privileging among the actors and the use of emotionally challenged terms/stereotypes/hate speech. The analysis of opinion pieces looks at several aspects of each text, including the main argument, its structure, implications, historical references, references to conspiracy theories, its connections to the political context and other media publications, inclusion/exclusion of the views of the opposite side, concessions to the opponents and the explanatory mechanisms employed by the author in the construction of the text. In concluding the qualitative research, we present a comparative portrait of both the news reports and opinion pieces as they appear in different outlets.

The overall conclusion of our report will incorporate the findings of the quantitative research with those of the qualitative analysis in order to identify the general tendencies within Turkish mainstream media that accompany the improvement of the relations between Turkey and Armenia.

2. SCOPE OF THE SURVEY

2.1. Selected Sources

This survey covers four daily newspapers, **Hürriyet**, **Zaman**, **Cumhuriyet**, **Sabah**, and one online source, **NTV**. We have established that the selected outlets published 1607 items during the seven time spans.

All of these outlets operate within the political spectrum that delimits the field of the mainstream media. The newspapers are chosen on the basis of their circulation and according to their ideological standpoints, while the online source NTV is selected for its neutral stance *vis-à-vis* the current political divisions of the mainstream media.

Hürriyet is usually referred to as the “Admiral Ship” of the mainstream media. It has the second highest circulation among other dailies. It is part of the Dogan Media group, which has been involved with some dispute with the government. Consequently, **Hürriyet** is expected at the outset to adopt a critical distance from the government’s position, including in general the foreign policy and, in particular, the recent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. **Cumhuriyet**’s circulation is the lowest among the selected outlets. With its irreconcilable Kemalist and secularist orientation, it represents a harder oppositional position to the governments’ policies within the mainstream media. Although disputed by independent sources, the circulation rate of **Zaman** is the highest of the Turkish press. It is linked to the Fethullah Gülen Movement and although it publishes opinion pieces reflecting a variety of political views, **Zaman**’s editorial position has been supportive of the government policies. **Sabah** is the third most circulated newspaper of the Turkey. It is currently owned by the Çalık group, which is renowned with its close relations with the Prime Minister Erdoğan. Consequently, **Sabah**’s coverage is expected to be supportive of the government policies. The online source **NTV** is selected for its neutral position.

We have also taken into account the fact that two newspapers from the opposite sides, **Hürriyet** and **Sabah**, are more news stories oriented and more “hype” based as opposed to “substance”; while, on the other hand, **Zaman** and **Cumhuriyet**, again from the opposing sides, deserve more space to opinion pieces, including comments and analysis.

Table 1 demonstrates the current circulation rates of the above newspapers.

Table 1. 2010 Newspaper Circulations (Source: Medyatava)

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August
Hürriyet	460,423	455,020	483,896	459,015	468,212	447,377	437,343	442,139
Zaman	806,299	787,871	797,098	880,250	879,660	799,663	714,442	675,009
Sabah	374,143	376,283	370,771	352,102	361,355	341,403	344,562	351,335
Cumhuriyet	52,687	53,132	51,794	50,982	54,711	54,943	54,292	53,586

2.2. Selected Periods

We selected seven periods between August 2008 and September 2010. During these periods, the media interest in the Turkish-Armenian relations is expected to be high due to the political context. The first period, August 20 - September 10, 2008, covers the “football diplomacy” between the two countries, which was marked with mutual presidential visits to soccer games between the two national teams in Yerevan and Bursa. The main events of the second period, April 2009, include the US President Obama’s visit to Turkey on April 6-7 and the April 22 announcement about the existence of a road map of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. During the third period, October 2009, Protocols for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Turkey and Armenia were signed (on October 10). The fourth period, December 2009 and January 2010, covers the crisis over the protocols, which also corresponds to the anniversary of the assassination of the prominent Turkish journalist of Armenian origin, Hrant Dink. The fifth period, March 1-20, 2010, witnessed the US Congress’ discussion on the events of 1915, including the passing of a motion in the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding the recognition of genocide. During the sixth period, April 15-30, 2010, a crisis on the implementation of the Protocols erupted between the two countries, leading their effective suspension. The final period was selected for an unprecedented event in modern Turkish history, that is, the first service at Akhtamar Church in September 2010, which received immediate nationalist reactions.

3. CONTENT ANALYSIS

3.1. Sources

Tables 2a and 2b shows that, except for the NTV, all the outlets use their own news agencies and reporters in gathering news. Hürriyet is distinguished by using internal political agencies, 43% more than Zaman 4%, Cumhuriyet and Sabah both 1%. This may be due to Hürriyet's coverage of more opposition political party leaders' and deputies' statements and oppositions to the normalization process and their concern with the exclusion of Azerbaijan from the process.

Table 2a. Sources

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Own Material	1304	81,1	81,1	81,1
	External Material	208	12,9	12,9	94,1
	Internal Political Forces	49	3,0	3,0	97,1
	NGOs	7	0,4	0,4	97,6
	Other	39	2,4	2,4	100,0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 2b. Sources * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Hurriyet	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Sabah	NTV	Total
Sources	Own Material	575	70	349	297	13	1304
	External Material	59	5	75	53	16	208
	Internal Political Forces	43	1	4	1	0	49
	NGOs	3	0	4	0	0	7
	Other	0	0	1	38	0	39
Total		680	76	433	389	29	1607

Table 2c. Sources by Newspaper (% of total)

	Own Material	External Material	Internal Political Forces	NGOs	Other	All
Hurriyet	44.1	28.4	87.8	42.9	0.0	42.3
Cumhuriyet	5.4	2.4	2.0	0.0	0.0	4.7
Zaman	26.8	36.1	8.2	57.1	2.6	26.9
Sabah	22.8	25.5	2.0	0.0	97.4	24.2
NTV	1.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3.2. Genre

Table 3a shows that the normalization between Armenia and Turkey and issues related to Armenia have been mostly covered as news stories, 69.1%. Newspaper columns followed this rate by 24.8%, while analytic pieces constitute 6.1% of the total coverage. Table 3b demonstrates the distribution of genres across the newspapers and NTV online, and the percentages of the same data are demonstrated in Table

3c. News stories figure the highest percentage for each outlet. Analysis genre is higher in Zaman, 46.9%, than the other newspapers. Zaman was particularly supportive of government during the normalization process and gave more space to expert opinions on the Armenian-Turkish relations.

Table 3a. Genres

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	News	1111	69,1	69,1	69,1
	Analysis	98	6,1	6,1	75,2
	Columns	398	24,8	24,8	100,0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 3b. Newspaper * Genres Crosstabulation

		News	Analysis	Columns	Total
Newspaper	Hurriyet	468	34	178	680
	Cumhuriyet	44	9	23	76
	Zaman	310	46	77	433
	Sabah	265	6	118	389
	NTV	24	3	2	29
Total		1111	98	398	1607

Table 3c. Genres distribution by newspaper (% of total)

	News	Analysis	Columns	Total
Hurriyet	42.1	34.7	44.7	42.3
Cumhuriyet	4.0	9.2	5.8	4.7
Zaman	27.9	46.9	19.3	26.9
Sabah	23.9	6.1	29.6	24.2
NTV	2.2	3.1	0.5	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3.3. Frequency

The selected outlets published 1607 items during the seven time spans as indicated in Table 4. As the numbers demonstrate, newspaper coverage of before and after signing of the protocols between Armenia and Turkey in October 2009 and the discussion on genocide in the US Congress in March 2010 have the highest coverage 19.4% in both. The coverage rates of these events are followed by Obama's visit to Turkey and his congressional speech in April 2009, 14.7%, and the football diplomacy in 2008 August and September, 13.9%. The crisis over the protocols and the anniversary of Hrant Dink assassination, in December 2009 and January 2010, 11.8%, Akhtamar Church service in September 2010, 11%, and the suspension of protocols in April 2010, 9.9%, received less coverage than the other events mentioned above.

Table 4. Distribution of publications by Time Span (% of total)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	August 20- September 10, 2008	224	13.9	13.9	13.9
	April 1- April 30, 2009	236	14.7	14.7	28.6
	October 1-31, 2009	311	19.4	19.4	48.0
	December 1 2009-January 31, 2010	189	11.8	11.8	59.7
	March 1-20, 2010	311	19.4	19.4	79.1
	April 15-30, 2010	159	9.9	9.9	89.0
	September 1-30, 2010	177	11.0	11.0	100.0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 5 below indicates the coverage of Armenia-Turkey relations for per outlet. Hürriyet's coverage of the seven periods is the highest, 42.3%, followed by Zaman 26.9% and Sabah 24.2%.

Table 5. Newspaper

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Hurriyet	680	42.3	42.3	42.3
	Cumhuriyet	76	4.7	4.7	47.0
	Zaman	433	26.9	26.9	74.0
	Sabah	389	24.2	24.2	98.2
	NTV	29	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	1607	100.0	100.0	

3.4. Specificity

Table 6a shows that there is an almost equal coverage of normalization process between Armenia and Turkey and the general news and comments on Armenia. The distribution of the coverage among the outlets, however, indicates some considerable differences. Hürriyet's 50.2% and NTV's 2.3% coverage of Armenia in general are higher than the news and comments related to normalization process 34% and 1.2%, as in Tables 6b and 6c. In Cumhuriyet, Zaman and Sabah, the coverage of the directly related topics is higher than of the news and comments in general.

Table 6a. Specificity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	News and comments in general	818	50,9	50,9	50,9
	News and comments directly related	789	49,1	49,1	100,0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 6b. Newspaper * Specificity Crosstabulation

		News and comments in general	News and comments directly related	Total
Newspaper	Hurriyet	411	269	680
	Cumhuriyet	16	60	76
	Zaman	201	232	433
	Sabah	171	218	389
	NTV	19	10	29
Total		818	789	1607

Table 6c. Specificity (% of total)

	News and in comments in general	News and comments directly related	Total
Hurriyet	50.2	34.1	42.3
Cumhuriyet	2.0	7.6	4.7
Zaman	24.6	29.4	26.9
Sabah	20.9	27.6	24.2
NTV	2.3	1.3	1.8
Total	100	100	100

3.5. Subject

Newspapers' coverage of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement in terms of foreign policy with 64% and domestic policy with 14.6% shows that the journalistic choice of newsworthiness is closely following the official agenda. Against these high proportions, the human dimension, 3%, social cultural issues, 9.2%, and issues related to economy, 2.1%, receive considerably low rates. Overall, this profile indicates that the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is extensively treated as a state affair rather than a process with social, cultural, economic and human dimensions. The low coverage of history 6.5%, which is predominantly related to 1915 events, is a reflection of the unpreparedness of the Turkish public to discuss this tragedy and face its consequences.

Table 7a. Subjects Covered

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Foreign Policy	1028	64,0	64,0	64,0
	Internal Policy	234	14,6	14,6	78,5
	Economy	33	2,1	2,1	80,6
	Social and Cultural Issues	148	9,2	9,2	89,8
	History	104	6,5	6,5	96,3
	Human Dimension	49	3,0	3,0	99,3
	Other	11	0,7	0,7	100,0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 7b. Subject Covered * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Hurriyet	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Sabah	NTV	Total
Subject Covered	Foreign Policy	428	47	304	232	17	1028
	Internal Policy	127	29	30	43	5	234
	Economy	16	0	6	11	0	33
	Social and Cultural Issues	39	0	54	49	6	148
	History	69	0	11	24	0	104
	Human Dimension	1	0	21	27	0	49
	Other	0	0	7	3	1	11
Total		680	76	433	389	29	1607

Table 7c. Subject Covered (% of total)

	Foreign Policy	Domestic Policy	Economy	Social Cultural Issues	History	Human Dimension	Other	Total
Hurriyet	41.6	54.2	48.4	26.3	66.3	2	0	42.3
Cumhuriyet	4.5	12.3	0	0	0	0	0	4.7
Zaman	29.5	12.8	18.1	36.4	10.5	42.8	63.6	26.9
Sabah	22.5	18.3	33.3	33.1	23.	55.1	27.2	24.2
NTV	1.6	2.1	0	4.0	0	0	9	1.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Foreign policy appears to be the main focus for each outlet in their coverage of Armenia and normalization. While the “civil” subjects of economy, social/cultural, history and human dimension are very low in oppositional outlets (Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet), in the pro-government outlets, who are supportive of the normalization process (Zaman and Sabah), include these subjects more. It can be concluded that while the opposition try to isolate the issue to the State, the pro-government media demonstrates some concern for the dissemination of the process through society. This point is further vindicated by the findings of the next section.

3.6. Main Stimulants of the Media Coverage of Armenia and Armenia-Turkey Relations

The highest percentage of the coverage of state to state relations, 62.2%, indicates that the Turkish press mainly focuses on the official agenda with regard to Armenia-Turkey relations. This stimulant is followed by State to Citizen (9.7%) and Intellectuals (8.6%). The least attention is paid to the NGOs, which signify the official as opposed to civil perception of the matter by the Turkish media (and public). Similarly, the interest towards Armenian civil actors is very low (2.9%), even lower than the Armenian Diaspora (3.4%), demonstrating that for the Turkish media, the participants of the process are mainly the governments as opposed to societies.

Table 8a. Main Parties

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	State to State	999	62,2	62,2	62,2
	State to Citizen	156	9,7	9,7	71,9
	Citizen to Citizen	86	5,4	5,4	77,2
	NGOs	25	1,6	1,6	78,8
	Diaspora	54	3,4	3,4	82,1
	Armenian Civil	47	2,9	2,9	85,1
	Intellectuals	139	8,6	8,6	93,7
	Social Actors	76	4,7	4,7	98,4
	Others	25	1,6	1,6	100,0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 8b. Main Parties * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Hurriyet	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Sabah	NTV	Total
Main Parties	State to State	417	40	286	236	20	999
	State to Citizen	58	28	35	34	1	156
	Citizen to Citizen	56	0	15	8	7	86
	NGOs	8	0	7	10	0	25
	Diaspora	21	0	17	16	0	54
	Armenian Civil	15	6	10	16	0	47
	Intellectuals	98	0	16	25	0	139
	Social Actors	7	2	29	38	0	76
	Others	0	0	18	6	1	25
Total		680	76	433	389	29	1607

Table 8c. Main Parties by newspaper (% of total)

	State to State	State to Citizen	Citizen to Citizen	NGOs	Diaspora	American Civil	Intellectuals	Social Actors	Others	Total
Hurriyet	41.7	37.1	65.1	32	38.8	31.9	70.5	9.2	0	42.3
Cumhuriyet	4	17.9	0	0	0	12.7	0	2.6	0	4.7
Zaman	28.5	22.4	17.4	28	31.4	21.2	11.5	38.1	72	26.9
Sabah	23.6	21.7	9.3	40	29.6	34	17.9	50	24	24.2
NTV	2	0.6	8.1	0	0	0	0	0	4	1.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

3.7. Context

As seen in Table 9a, taken together with the subjects covered, politicians are the main actors of the Armenia-Turkey relations. Turkish political actors include the President, Prime Minister, ministers and leaders of the opposition parties and parliamentary deputies from all parties. Among these, most of the attention is paid to the government representatives.

Other political actors include the US, EU, Russia and Azerbaijan. Non-political actors range from football officials to the members of the Armenian religious figures to ordinary citizens and intellectuals.

Table 9a also reveals a low level of coverage, only 9%, of the point of views of the Armenian political actors, implicating the reign of one-sided journalism, through which the principle of objectivity is seriously compromised.

Table 9a. Context

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Turkish political actors and point of views	664	41,3	41,3	41,3
	Armenian Political Actors Point of views	144	9,0	9,0	50,3
	Other political actors	406	25,3	25,3	75,5
	Non-political actors	393	24,5	24,5	100,0
	Total	1607	100,0	100,0	

Table 9b. Context * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Hurriyet	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Sabah	NTV	Total
Context	Turkish political actors and point of views	269	33	169	188	5	664
	Armenian Political Actors Point of views	47	29	28	31	9	144
	Other political actors	181	9	125	84	7	406
	non-political actors	183	5	111	86	8	393
	Total	680	76	433	389	29	1607

Table 9c. Context

	Turkish P. Actors point of views	American P. Actors Point of views	Other Political Actors	Non-political Actors	Total
Hurriyet	40.5	32.6	44.5	46.5	42.3
Cumhuriyet	4.9	20.1	2.2	1.2	4.7
Zaman	25.4	19.4	30.7	28.2	26.9
Sabah	28.3	21.5	20.6	21.8	24.2
NTV	0.7	6.25	1.7	2	1.8

A more detailed data in Table 9c shows a general trend in newspapers use of Turkish political actors' voices as the primary source of news and commentary, except NTV 0.7%. Although Hürriyet's coverage of Armenia-Turkey relations is extensive, outnumbering the other sources in both news stories and columns, Hürriyet gave an equal weight to the opposition opinions both in Turkey and Azerbaijan whereas Zaman's coverage was biased towards government, the President and those close to government as shown in Table 9b. However, it should be noted that Hürriyet's balanced reporting does not appear as a consequence of a major journalistic principle but rather as an expression of their sustained oppositional position to the government's political line. Similarly, the difference between the coverage of Turkish political actors' and Armenian political actors' views is close in Cumhuriyet. As in Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet's assignment of more space to the point of views of the Armenian political actors is usually motivated, employed to prepare the grounds for counter arguments by their writers.

3.8. Third Parties

The role of the USA, Azerbaijan and Karabagh in Turkish-Armenian relations is clearly revealed in Tables 10a and 10b. The USA initiative in the signing of was an outstanding theme in the news stories and columns. Opposition by Azerbaijan to the protocols and Armenian -Turkish normalization was a focus of attention especially in Hürriyet (59 cases), Zaman 78 cases and Sabah 88 cases, whereas Cumhuriyet focused more on the role of the USA, 33 cases.

Table 10a. Third Parties

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	USA	263	16,4	31,2	31,2
	Azerbaijan	127	7,9	15,1	46,3
	Karabagh	78	4,9	9,3	55,6
	Diaspora	66	4,1	7,8	63,4
	NGO	3	,2	,4	63,8
	Intellectuals	35	2,2	4,2	67,9
	EU	25	1,6	3,0	70,9
	West	36	2,2	4,3	75,2
	Russia	34	2,1	4,0	79,2
	Other	175	10,9	20,8	100,0
	Total	842	52,4	100,0	
Missing	System	765	47,6		
Total		1607	100,0		

Table 10b. Third Parties * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Hurriyet	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Sabah	NTV	Total
Third Parties	USA	51	33	78	88	13	263
	Azerbaijan	59	3	32	30	3	127
	Karabagh	35	4	29	10	0	78
	Diaspora	23	0	21	22	0	66
	NGO	0	0	2	1	0	3
	Intellectuals	1	16	12	6	0	35
	EU	6	0	11	8	0	25
	West	13	2	9	11	1	36
	Russia	8	0	11	15	0	34
	Other	2	18	103	40	12	175
Total		198	76	308	231	29	842

Table 10c. Third Parties by newspaper (% of total)

	USA	Azerbaijan	Karabagh	Diaspora	NGO	Intellectuals	EU	West	Russia	Other	Total
Hurriyet	19.3	46.4	44.8	34.8	0	2.8	24	36.1	23.5	1.1	23.5
Cumhuriyet	12.5	2.3	5.1	0	0	45.7	0	5.5	0	10.2	9
Zaman	29.6	25.1	37.1	31.8	66.6	34.2	44	25	32.3	58.8	36.5
Sabah	33.4	23.6	12.8	33.3	33.3	17.1	32	30.5	44.11	22.8	27.4
NTV	4.9	2.3	0	0	0	0	0	2.7	0	6.8	3.4

3.9. Content

Table 11a indicates that Zaman and Sabah, both close to government, have more positive coverage, 203/433 and 116/389, than the other sources. Negative coverage of the Armenia-Turkey relations is higher in Cumhuriyet, 54/76 than the other sources. Although positive coverage of Hürriyet seems higher, 132, than Sabah, 116, the proportion of the positive coverage in comparison to the total coverage, 680, indicates a far lower rate in Hürriyet. Similarly 54 pieces out of a total of 76 in Cumhuriyet are negative.

Overall, in Table 11b, negative coverage is 34.3%, while positive and neutral coverage is each 30.2%.

Table 11a. Content * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Hurriyet	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Sabah	NTV	Total
Content	Negative	261	54	130	91	16	552
	Positive	132	22	203	116	13	486
	Neutral	280	0	54	151	0	485
	Unclear	7	0	46	31	0	84
Total		680	76	433	389	29	1607

Table 11b. Content

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Negative	552	34.3	34.3	34.3
	Positive	486	30.2	30.2	64.6
	Neutral	485	30.2	30.2	94.8
	Unclear	84	5.2	5.2	100.0
Total		1607	100.0	100.0	

Table 11c. Content by newspaper (% of total)

	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Unclear	Total
Hurriyet	47.2	27.1	57.7	8.3	42.3
Cumhuriyet	9.7	4.5	0	0	4.7
Zaman	23.5	41.7	11.1	54.7	26.9
Sabah	16.4	23.8	31.2	36.9	24.3
NTV	2.8	2.6	0	0	1.8

3.10. Quantitative Research Findings

We have derived the conclusions below from the content analysis of the 1607 items that have been published by the five selected mainstream media outlets during seven selected sequences between September 2008 and September 2010.

It has been observed that in their majority the selected outlets rely on their own news agencies and reporters in gathering news on Armenia-Turkey normalization process. The process was covered primarily as news stories, followed by commentary by columnists (24.8%) and a low rate of analytic pieces (6.1%). The exception to this

general tendency is Zaman, which has the highest rate of analytic articles (46.9%) containing expert opinion.

The most frequently reported and commented on events are both formal foreign policy issues, and both have been participated by the US. During the signing of protocols in October 2009, the US administration was the key mediator, while the October 2010 events exclusively took place in the US Congress. Interestingly, the lowest coverage was reserved for one of the most critical developments in the process, that is, the suspension of the protocols in April 2010. The preliminary conclusion that these findings lead us is that the Turkish mainstream media is interested in the normalization process as much as it is related to the Turkish-US relations. Consequently, the Turkish media views the US administration as a primary participant of the process, at least as important as the Turkish and Armenian governments.

Regarding specificity, it has been observed that the general news and comments on the Armenian issues have the equal weight as the recent normalization process. In media coverage, the process is mainly considered within the context of foreign policy and domestic politics. The social implications of normalization, including its human dimension, social/cultural aspects, economic dimension, and its possible impact on the disputed historical issues have received low interest.

The main actors of the process are portrayed as the Turkish politicians, including primarily the Turkish government figures. Very poor attention is paid on the Armenian political actors, and the Armenian side's approach to the issues receives very low coverage.

Regarding the third parties, the US administration has been paid special attention. Azerbaijan government, particularly in relation to the Karabagh issue and their opposition to the protocols, has received extensive coverage. Russia and the EU have been treated as not very significant third parties, even less important than the Armenian Diaspora in the West.

When the overall rates of positive and neutral attitudes of the Turkish mainstream media are added up, they are observed as higher than the negative coverage of the Armenia-Turkey normalization. The mainstream media is clearly divided between supporters (*Zaman* and *Sabah*: 319 positive vs. 221 negative in total) and opponents (*Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet*: 315 negative vs. 154 positive in total) of the government's political line.

The approach and the rates of coverage also vary from one source to the other according to their political stances. The oppositional press, *Cumhuriyet* and *Hürriyet*, in general reflect the critical views both in Turkey and Azerbaijan. *Zaman* and *Sabah*, on the other hand, report more the Turkish government's views. Also while the governments of Turkey and Armenia, and the US administration are viewed as the main actors of the process, the pro-government press demonstrates some effort to disseminate the issue through the social field.

Nevertheless, the analyzed outlets as the representatives of Turkish mainstream journalism share the following aspects:

1. The Armenia-Turkey normalization process is portrayed mainly as an issue of foreign affairs.
2. It is presented primarily as a State to State official affair, and the societal/human dimension is largely neglected.
3. It is presented as a process that concerns the relations between Turkey and the USA, at least as much as those between Turkey and Armenia, if not more. The US administration is perceived as a major participant rather than as one of the “third parties” as such.
4. The major third party involved in the process - after the US administration - is presented as the Azerbaijan government. The Armenian Diaspora is taken as a more significant (primarily negative) third party than the EU and Russia.
5. The views of the Armenian participants, be them official or social, are overwhelmingly excluded from the coverage of the process. If they are taken into account, this was only for the criticism of their views or for the criticism of the Turkish government’s “concessions”.
6. Finally, the aggregate of the neutral and positive coverage of the process outnumbers the negative coverage.

4. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Our qualitative analysis concentrates on the selected news reports and opinion pieces of the same sequences. We have analyzed fifteen randomly selected news stories and twelve opinion pieces, consisting of analytical pieces or commentaries by columnists and experts, from the four newspapers.

We have considered the news stories regarding the identity and the presentation of the key actors. The qualitative analysis also examines the news stories regarding bias, including the privileging among the actors and the use of emotionally challenged terms/stereotypes/hate speech.

The analysis of opinion pieces looks at several aspects of each text, including the main argument, its structure, implications, historical references, references to conspiracy theories, its connections to the political context and other media publications, inclusion/exclusion of the views of the opposite side, concessions to the opponents and the explanatory mechanisms employed by the author in the construction of the text. In concluding the qualitative research, we present a comparative portrait of both the news reports and opinion pieces as they appear in different outlets.

A list, including brief outline, of the quoted pieces are as follows:

News Stories:

Hürriyet

“Historical Decision” (September 4, 2008), reports on President Gül’s decision to visit Yerevan.

“Obama’s Visit” (April 7, 2009), reports on US President Barack Obama’s speech addressed to the Turkish Parliament that concerns Turkey, the US and Armenia.

“Signing of Protocols” (October 11, 2009), reports on the signing of protocols between Turkey and Armenia.

On November 19, 2009 the Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan’s statement is reported.

Zaman

“New Beginning with Yerevan” (September 7, 2008), reports on Gül’s visit.

“The Pain of Hundreds of Thousands of Turks should also be shared” (April 26, 2009) quotes President Gül’s statement on the discussion of genocide.

“We are not writing History; we are making History” (October 15, 2009) is based on President Gül’s statement on the signing of protocols.

“The Armenian Motion Passed with a fraction” (March 5, 2010) reports from the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on the motion to recognize the genocide.

Sabah

“We seize a historical opportunity; we need to be brave”, quotes President Gül on his visit to Yerevan.

“Diaspora Opening before the Opening of the Borders” (April 6, 2010) reports Davutoğlu’s meeting with the notables of the Armenian Diaspora in the US.

“Peace was made in the Balkans, why should it not be made with Yerevan?” (March 19, 2010) argues that if Serbia, with which Turkey has animosities for around a millennium, could be a friend, then peace with Armenia, with which Turkey’s animosities are no longer than a century, should also be possible.

Cumhuriyet

“Asala is also in the Protocol” (September 5, 2008), reports the claims that the former Armenian terrorist Varuzhan Karapetian is included in the protocol list to meet President Gül.

“The Roadmap with Yerevan is Ready” (April 23, 2009)

“Reaction to Historical Map of Armenia” (January 27, 2010) reports on the reactions by Turkish community against the demonstration of a “Greater Armenia” map at the George Washington University.

“The so-called Armenian Genocide” (March 25, 2010) criticizes the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not taking a firm stance against the recognition of genocide.

Commentary and Analysis:

Hürriyet

Hadi Uluengin’s article entitled “Football Diplomacy” dated September 4, 2008 expresses positive opinion on football diplomacy.

Oktay Ekşi’s article entitled “Gain or Loss” dated October 10, 2009 argues that the signing of protocols implies a loss, both by pressuring Turkey to recognize the genocide and by compromising Turkey’s eastern borders without guaranteeing the Armenian withdrawal from Karabagh.

Cüneyt Ülsever’s article entitled “Is this Foreign Policy?” dated December 20, 2009 expresses objections to the signing of the protocols without the Karabagh precondition.

Ferai Tınç’s article “The Silence of Obama” dated March 1, 2010 reads Obama’s silence on the motion of the recognition of genocide as a request to shelve the Karabagh condition.

Zaman

Ali Bulaç's article "Armenia Soccer Match" dated September 8, 2008 argues that the ideology of Islam as represented by President Gül is capable of improving relations with Armenia as opposed to nationalism.

Ali Bulaç's article entitled "The Great Disaster" dated April 27, 2009 argues that the term "genocide" will never be accepted by Turkey. Obama's term "Meds Yeghern", on the other hand, may be interpreted to include both Armenian and Muslim losses at the same time as pointed out by President Gül.

Zaman's editor in chief Ekrem Dumanlı's article entitled "While the Country's Vision Broadens" dated October 12, 2009 argues that the protocols with Armenia is a sign of changing Turkish foreign policy with a global vision.

Şahin Alpay's article dated October 9, 2010 argues that the passing of a motion on the recognition of genocide in the House of Representative's Committee of Foreign Affairs is unlikely to lead to any tragic changes.

Sabah

An article appeared in September 2008 entitled "Should He Go or Should He Not?" outlines the pros and cons to Gül's prospective visit to Yerevan. The cons include the potential objections in Turkey, from within the AKP and in Azerbaijan.

Cumhuriyet

Mustafa Balbay's article dated September 5, 2008 argues that Gül's visit will only harm the Turkish interests.

Özgen Acar's article entitled "Uncle Sam's Democracy" dated March 9, 2010 argues that the voting of the motion for the recognition of the Armenian genocide at the Foreign Affairs Committee will be motivated by US domestic political concerns.

Ali Sirmen's article entitled "The Problem with Armenia and the Strange Armenian" dated March 19, 2010 criticizes PM Erdoğan's threat of deporting one hundred thousand Armenian illegal workers.

4.1. Evaluation of the Language of the News Stories

Hürriyet refers to President Gül, President Obama, US Minister of State Clinton, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Armenian Prime Minister and Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reference to each party above is balanced.

Zaman takes President Gül and Turkish Foreign Minister as the key actors each referred to three times. The Armenian President and the US president are presented among key actors twice. Additionally US House of Representatives is the key actor of one news article, while the Armenian Constitutional Court enters as a key actor in one of the news stories. This equalizes the US and Armenia as key actors. But the weight on the Turkish side is not challenged by the presentation of the US, since Turkish side has also been mentioned as Turkey (2), Ankara and Turkish Prime Minister in various news stories.

In *Sabah* news stories, Turkish Foreign Minister emerges as the most frequently referred (2) key actor. President Gül is also a key actor. *Sabah* mentions Armenia and Diaspora also as key actors and in a neutral manner.

Cumhuriyet mentions Turkish Foreign Ministry (2) as an institution rather than in the personality of the Foreign Minister. The Armenian side enters the stories many times but each time as negative actors involved in conspiracies, including Asala, Karapetian, Armenian Government and Armenian Lobby. The key actors, frequently mentioned in other newspapers' reports are not found in *Cumhuriyet*.

Overall, the most frequently referred key actor in the selected news pieces is Turkish Foreign Ministers (6 out of 15 articles), Babacan (1) and then Davutoğlu (5). Ahmet Davutoğlu emerges as the main architect of the piece process, followed by President Abdullah Gül referred in 5 articles as a key actor. The US administration (2), President Obama (2), US House of Representatives and the US Minister of State Clinton are taken in six articles as key actors, while the Armenian President is referred to as a key actor in 2 stories. The Armenian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are each referred once. Similarly, the Turkish Prime Minister is presented as not an important actor and mentioned only once

In most of the news stories on events where the Armenian side was present, unilateral reporting is observed. Turkish actors have been emphasized and extensively reported while the Armenian actors are played down. In the majority of the cases, the US administration is mentioned more than the Armenian actors. In certain cases, the US administration role as a key actor is overemphasized over both the Turkish and Armenian initiatives.

In aggregate, state actors, including the Turkish and Armenian Presidents, Turkish and Armenian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and regarding the third parties the senior figures of US administration, including in particular President Obama and Minister of State Clinton, are presented as the main actors, which vindicates that the media views in its majority the normalization process primarily as an inter-state process. The non-state actors usually enter the media's discourse as negative elements, including "Armenian terrorists", "Dashnaks", Armenian Lobby in the US, which aim to disturb the advance of normalization process, and/or to harm "Turkish interests".

Overall, traces of hate speech and stereotyping are not found in the language of the mainstream media. In *Cumhuriyet*, and very rarely and lightly in *Zaman*, emotionally challenged terms, including "so-called genocide", "hidden agenda", "Armenian terrorist" (*Cumhuriyet*) and "Dashnaks" (*Zaman*) are employed.

4.2. Opinion Pieces

Of the twelve analytical pieces/commentaries considered here, five articles support the rapprochement process while five authors express their opposition. Two pieces provide critical support to the process. The authors' approach to the process is usually determined by their position towards the government. Those, who oppose the government line usually oppose the normalization process, too.

In *Hürriyet*, two pieces by Oktay Ekşi and Cüneyt Ülsever, clearly oppose the process, while one piece by Hadi Uluengin supports it. Ferai Tinç's article does not

oppose the process but expresses criticism on certain aspects of government's handling of it. The four pieces by *Zaman* commentators all express support for the process. Similarly, all three articles selected from *Cumhuriyet* express opposition to the process. *Sabah* article is critical of the process, although the newspaper is renowned for its support of the government line.

The arguments in most of the pieces are constructed through the criticism of other opinions. Most of the *Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet* articles take the government as their subject of criticism. In Balbay's article the Armenian government, in addition to the Turkish government and President Gül, is also criticized for making claims against Turkish interests. The exception is Uluengin's article, which is supportive of the process and the government line and externalizes the Ittihatçı and Dashnak mentalities on Turkish and Armenian sides as the main obstacles of the process. *Zaman* authors construct their arguments against the "Turkish establishment" or the supporters of the "status quo", by which they mean the opposition and the critiques of the government in the media. The exception is Şahin Alpay's article where "Ankara" is criticized for overreacting to the US House of Representative's debate on Armenian genocide.

Historical references are found in five articles. Uluengin refers to the history as "bloody events", while Ekşi mentions "events of 1915" and 1921 Kars Treaty. Ali Bulaç, in two articles, refers to "Great Disaster", which he proposes to replace the term "genocide", which he portrays as "the mutual slaughter of the Ottoman elites and Armenians". Şahin Alpay refers to "the expulsion of the Ottoman Armenians" to argue that the Ottoman state and not the republic is responsible for its consequences.

In the construction of the arguments, trivial claims are frequently employed as premises. Ekşi's main premise, for example, is that "the US and Armenia cannot be trusted". Cüneyt Ülsever does not provide for his claim that "protocols are imposed by the US, Russia and the EU" any evidence. Similarly, Ali Bulaç takes it as an undisputed fact that "the Armenian insistence on the term Genocide implies that they have a Hidden Agenda". Dumanlı refers to a conspiracy which "attempts to put the 'Turkish World' under pressure".

The elements that are presented as threats to the Turkish-Armenian good relations are "The West" and "nationalism" (Bulaç) and "Armenian Diaspora" (Dumanlı). For Uluengin, this threat emerges from the Ittihatçı and Dashnak mentalities on Turkish and Armenian sides.

Among the third parties the US's role is emphasized in the majority of the articles. Tınç argues that "Turkish US relations are more important than Turkish Armenian relations", while Ekşi asserts that "US pressure is the most important reason of the signing of protocols". Similarly, Cüneyt Ülsever argues that "protocols are imposed by the EU, Russia and the US". Tınç also presents the Armenian motion on genocide as an essentially US-Turkey affair. Overall, US's importance is emphasized by Ekşi, Ülsever, Bulaç and Acar. Acar mentions the US importance in the context of Turkey's importance, arguing that "the US needs to maintain Turkey's support".

The only exception is Dumanlı's criticism in *Zaman* of the exaggeration of the US's role in the Turkish media.

The other significant third party is Azerbaijan, which appears as a major political actor in Tınç's article and Sabah article.

An interesting view is Ali Sirmen's critique of the Prime Minister's threat of deportation. Sirmen's position is not however based on any humanitarian principle as such but the difficulty that in which this statement puts Turkey. He consequently criticizes the Prime Minister for lacking vision and skills.

4.3. An Overview of the Qualitative Research Findings

In most of the news stories the Turkish actors have been given more coverage than their Armenian counterparts. In the majority of the cases, the US administration is mentioned more than the Armenian actors. In certain cases, the US administration role as a key actor is overemphasized over both the Turkish and Armenian initiatives.

In aggregate, state actors, including in particular the Turkish, Armenian and US state figures, are presented as the main actors. Non-state elements, all Armenian, are referred merely as those aim to disturb the process, or harm Turkish interests. Although hate speech and stereotyping are avoided, emotionally challenged terms - loaded with hostility to the Armenians - are employed.

In the opinion pieces, the authors' positions regarding normalization process are usually determined by their position towards the government. The exceptions are two *Hürriyet* writers, one criticizing government's practice while supporting the process and the other supporting the government line. Also the opinion piece in *Sabah* elaborates a balanced analysis.

Arguments criticize either the government line or the opposition to the government line. The rapprochement is in that sense taken as a material for domestic political debate. Historical references include the 1915 deportation of the Armenian population and the 1921 Kars Treaty. There is a consensus on the denial of the genocide or attempting to balance it with the atrocities against the Turks.

Trivial premises in the construction of arguments include assertions that contain hostility towards the "US or the West" and the "Armenians", associated by conspiracies and "hidden agendas". Armenian Diaspora emerges as the major threat to the process and the "Turkish interests".

The major third party according to the opinion pieces is the US. US's role is viewed as even more important than Armenian role. Azerbaijan is also mentioned as a significant third party.

Following generalizations are plausible on the grounds of our qualitative research:

1. The Armenia-Turkey normalization process is portrayed mainly as an extension of domestic politics, rather than an issue in its own right of foreign affairs.
2. It is presented primarily as a State to State official affair. Non-state elements only enter the scene as negative actors.

3. It is presented as a process that concerns the relations between Turkey and the USA, at least as much as those between Turkey and Armenia, if not more. The US administration is perceived as a major participant rather than as one of the “third parties” as such.
4. The major third party involved in the process - after the US administration - is presented as the Azerbaijan government. The Armenian Diaspora is taken as the major negative element.
5. The views of the Armenian participants are mostly excluded from the news stories and opinion pieces. The Armenian “intentions” only enter the texts as a negative element insinuating a “hidden Armenian agenda”.
6. The normalization process is defended or criticized in relation to the “Turkish interests.” The oppositional discourse criticizes the government for concessions to the Armenians, while the pro-government discourse criticizes the opposition for harming Turkey’s long-term interests.
7. Finally, hate speech and stereotyping are avoided, although emotionally contested terms containing bias against the Armenians are employed in the discourse of particularly the opinion pieces.

5. COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

The findings of the quantitative and the qualitative analyses are in general complementary, although they seem to collide on an issue: while the quantitative research concludes that the media portrays the normalization process as a foreign affairs issue, the qualitative findings suggest that this portrayal is related to domestic politics.

We can incorporate the two levels of this survey to derive the following general conclusions:

1. The Armenia-Turkey normalization process is presented primarily as a State to State official affair. The main subjects the stories and comments and analysis consider are of official (political or diplomatic) nature.
2. Human interest stories, social/cultural aspects, non-government actors are noticeably absent. Non-state elements only enter the news and comments exclusively as negative factors.
3. The US administration is the major third party. The emphasis on the US role is so extreme that the process presented as concerning more the Turkish-US relations than Turkey-Armenia relations.
4. Azerbaijan is a significant third party, followed by the Armenian Diaspora, which is taken as the major negative element.
5. In the news stories and commentaries the views of the Armenian actors are excluded or under-represented. The Armenian opinions are usually taken as already known to be hostile to Turkish interests.
6. Historical references, particularly to 1915, are not very open.
7. Hate speech and clichés are avoided in the mainstream press. However, some emotionally contested terms charged with hostility towards Armenians are still employed particularly in the opinion pieces.
8. The aggregate of the neutral and positive coverage of the process in the selected media outlets outnumbers the negative coverage.

Finally, before concluding this report, we would like to emphasize an important feature that has not been covered within the overall framework of this report. Above conclusions present us a major assertion that a built in deep distrust towards the Armenian actors determines, to a large extent, the Turkish mainstream reportage and commentaries. We observe particularly that non-state Armenian elements enter the news stories and commentaries almost exclusively as negative factors. However, it raises some optimism for the future to observe that there are exceptions to this general rule. Table 12 below demonstrates that when events of social/cultural nature between the two countries occurred there is a tangible increase in the media's interest in human dimension and social/cultural inclined reporting. There are two

events of this nature - Turkey-Armenia national soccer games and the Akhtamar church service.

Table 12. Time Span*Subject Covered Crosstabulation

TimeSpan * SubjectCovered Crosstabulation

Count		SubjectCovered							Total
		Foreign Policy	Internal Policy	Economy	Social and Cultural Issues	History	Human DYmension	Other	
TimeSpan	Aug 20- Sept 10 2008	141	37	5	25	8	4	4	224
	April 1- April 30 2009	153	42	6	11	16	7	1	236
	October 1-31 2009	207	47	11	22	14	9	1	311
	December 1 2009-January 31 2010	109	24	0	24	27	5	0	189
	March 1-20 2010	239	43	4	7	11	7	0	311
	April 15-30 2010	105	18	2	13	13	6	2	159
	September 1-30 2010	74	23	5	46	15	11	3	177
Total		1028	234	33	148	104	49	11	1607

A close look in the selected outlets during for example the period of “football diplomacy” reveals that the language of conflict is avoided in parallel to more coverage of both non-state actors and opinion of the Armenian side. Let us take *Cumhuriyet’s* coverage of the period as an example, since this newspaper is renowned for its sustained criticism of the process.

On September 2, 2008, an interview with former Istanbul football star Garo Hamaciyen appears, where the interviewee emphasizes the necessity of fraternity between two peoples. On September 3, 2008, Turkish team’s manager Fatih Terim is quoted saying “we are not here for war but football”. This was responded on September 5 by the Armenian team’s manager Simonov criticizing the fans for not respecting the Turkish national anthem. On September 8, football commentator Arif Kızılyalın comments on his impressions from Yerevan. Most of this piece reflects the exclusively positive views of the Yerevan dwellers on football diplomacy.

Examples can easily be extended to cover the remaining media sources, all of which are identified with three essential features:

1. Each article in question reports or comments on non-state actors.
2. In most of the articles, the view of the “other side”, i.e. of the Armenian actors, is reported.
3. All of the articles’ general approach to the rapprochement is positive.
4. These articles appear during the times when cultural/social exchange occurs between two societies.

These analytic conclusions lead this research paper to submit one recommendation regarding the character of the rapprochement: more events of social/cultural nature between two societies seem to have the potential to serve the improvement of the discourse of the Turkish mainstream media in a more supportive direction of the process. Such events also increase the reflection of the Armenian actors’ opinions to the Turkish public, in parallel to a tangible tuning down of the prejudiced language of conflict and mistrust that still dominates the Turkish media mentalities.