MONITORING

OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF WEBSITE BLOCKING

ON THE AWARENESS OF THE AUDIENCE ON TOPICAL ISSUES

In the course of the 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabagh (September 27 - November 9, 2020) and in the post-war months, Azerbaijani online media turned to be inaccessible to the Armenian audience. This was both an element of the Martial Law, introduced in Armenia from the first day of the war, and a measure by the Azerbaijani side aimed at preventing possible DDoS attacks by Armenian hackers. Although the Martial Law regime envisages certain restrictions on the dissemination and receipt of information, the blocking of websites was viewed by a number of international and local Armenian organizations as a violation of the audience's rights to be informed about facts and events directly related to their vital interests.

The objective of this study was to identify the possible consequences of blocking Azerbaijani websites for the Armenian media audience. To this end, the monitoring team of Yerevan Press Club, using VPN/TOR tools, carried out a comparative study of the content of five Azerbaijani (vesti.az, media.az, day.az, report.az, trend.az) and five Armenian (news.am, www.aravot.am, lragir.am, 1lurer.am, tert.am) online media.

As a result of a survey of experts, 7 topics of particular importance and interest to the Armenian audience were selected for the study: 1. the course of hostilities; 2. the diplomatic process over Nagorno-Karabagh (statements, referencesto the format of the problem settlement, the possibilities of solution, etc.); 3. issues of prisoners of war and other detained persons; 4. the prospects for opening transport communications; 5. the activities of peacekeepers and their status; 6. the interference and role of external forces, the topic of mercenaries; 7. the tension and clashes in the border area.

The monitoring methodology implied recording references to the listed topics in the studied Azerbaijani sources, followed by a comparison of the reflection of these recorded events and facts in five Armenian media. The quantitative component of the study was aimed at calculating the coincidence (cases of discrepancy) of attention to the same events and facts in the Azerbaijani and Armenian sources. The mixed quantitative and qualitative component envisaged calculating the comparison (coincidence or discrepancy) of the interpretation of events and facts recorded both in one or several Azerbaijani media, and in one or several Armenian resources. At the same time, interpretation was understood to be the use of "dry facts", and not the assessments and opinions on them. The qualitative component envisaged case studies and general conclusions based on the monitoring results.

The following three periods were selected for study: the height of hostilities of the 44-Day War (October 1-31, 2020); the end of the war and the immediately following period (November 1-30, 2020); a period relatively remote from the war (April 1-30, 2021). The calculations were carried out both for each of these periods and for the entire study period (see the tables.

REPORT ON MONITORING RESULTS

OF ALL THE TOPICS STUDIED within the current monitoring, the course of hostilities of the 44-day Karabagh war received the greatest coverage in both the Azerbaijani and Armenian media. The discrepancies in both attention and interpretation of events were significant, which could to a large extent be due to the blocking of Internet resources. Moreover, this phenomenon was especially obvious in the period from October 1 to 31, 2020, when only in about 30% of cases the description of specific military operations, actions, other events, one way or another related to the war, in the Azerbaijani media coincided with at least one of the monitored Armenian media. At the same time, more than 70% of the episodes covered by the studied Azerbaijani sources were not reflected at all in the Armenian ones. Over the next month (November 1-30, 2020), the "coincidence index" increased to about 63%. This increase in the "index" is connected with the post-facto interpretation of the course of hostilities by the Armenian online media, following the Statement of the AR President, RA Prime-Minister and RF President of November 9/10, 2020 when both the society in general and journalists in particular showed substantially greater interest in getting a real picture of the events that played a critical role in the life of the country. At the same time, the coincidence of interest in specific episodes remained at about the same level. The upward trend in the "coincidence index" continued in the following months, and in April 2021 cases of a differing interpretation of the course of the war were no more than 10%. At the same time, the dynamics of the coincidence of interest in specific episodes was less intense. The discrepancy in attention still accounted for about 60% of the pieces on the topic. These figures indicate that the Armenian and Azerbaijani media audiences find themselves in sharply different information environments, which makes mutual understanding and the search for mutually beneficial solutions extremely challenging.

In October 2020, the largest discrepancy in the coverage of specific military events by the studied Armenian media was recorded with vesti.az pieces, in November 2020 - with trend.az, and in April 2021 - with report.az.

In particular, one of the vivid examples of restriction on audience access to up-to-date information on the course of hostilities, including as a result of the blocking of websites, was the complete disregard by the Armenian media of information about losses on the very first day of the war in 2020. Already on September 27, 2020 the Azerbaijani media reported on the destruction of up to 200 tanks and other armored vehicles, 228 artillery installations, multiple launch rocket systems and mortars, 30 air defense systems, 6 command and observation posts, 5 ammunition stockpiles, more than 110 units of vehicles and one S-300 air defense missile system. And only after the end of the war, this information was confirmed by a number of former high-ranking Armenian military and experts. For instance, former supreme commander of NK army Samvel Babayan said that it was 40% of ammunition at disposal of Armenian armed forces in Karabagh. Further, during the war, for the same reason, most of Armenian public did not receive information about the losses of military equipment either, including units of military aviation, which was widely disseminated by Azerbaijani, Turkish, Russian and other sources.

The monitoring team also recorded numerous cases of refutation of each other's information, which not always reached the media, among other things due to the blocking of sites. Thus, on October 3, 2020 the Azerbaijani media reported about serious injury of the President of Nagorno-Karabagh Arayik Harutyunyan. The Armenian sources categoricallydeniedthosereports.

Characteristic were the discrepancies regarding the reasons for the violation of the ceasefire agreements reached on October 10 (at the initiative of the Russian Federation), October 19 (at the initiative of France) and October 26 (at the initiative of the United States). In all three cases, the studied media of Azerbaijan and Armenia reported messages containing accusations of the other side for breaking the accords.

As an example of coincidence between the news of the Azerbaijani and Armenian media, one can single out the regular reporting of Yerevan data on the number of dead Armenian military servicemen by the studied Azerbaijani Internet resources. Though this phenomenon was observed mainly in the first half of the 44-Day War: there after, the Azerbaijani sources in parallel began to more frequently disseminate their own information about the casualties among the Armenian troops, which differed from those reported by Yerevan.

The conflicting repercussionson the course of the war continued in the Azerbaijani and Armenian media even months after the November 9 ceasefire. Thus, in April 2021, the use of "Iskander" missile by the Armenian side during the battles for the city of Shushi emerged as a pressing topic in the Azerbaijani information space. At the same time, Baku disseminated this information as something unquestionable. Yerevan, represented by the Prime Minister, former high-ranking military and experts, presented various versions regarding the inefficient use of this weapon. Moscow, on the other hand, through the Russian President's Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, initially denied the fact of "Iskander" having been used, and after wards only made a comment that the issue was being studied. At the same time, although the blocking of the Azerbaijani websites was still ongoing, all those versions with different intensity and emphases were being disseminated both in the Azerbaijani and Armenian media.

Similarly, the studied Azerbaijani and Armenian resources with varying intensity and emphases covered the topic of minefields, the provision of their maps, victims from explosions, etc. However, regarding this issue again the discrepancies in the presentation of the problem were caused not by the continuing blocking of sites, but by the difference in information priorities.

The differing attitude to the events was to an even greater extent reflected in the Azerbaijani and Armenian media coverage of the April 12, 2021 opening of the Military Trophy Park in Baku. In most of the pieces of the Azerbaijani media studied, this was presented as an important event, a highly commendable initiative. Whereas the Armenian media expressed exclusively resentment, actively referring to the comments bya number ofpersonalities from third countries.

THE TOPIC OF THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL FORCES in the conflict was in the second place in terms of frequency of reference in the studied media of the two countries. Here, the discrepancy in attention to specific events and episodes was manifested to a lesser extent: in all three periods of monitoring it remained at the level of 45-60%. As for the discrepancy in the interpretation of these events, it was significantly less than when referring to the episodes of the war (hereafter it should be taken into account that in the frames of this monitoring interpretation was understood to be solely the use of certain facts and not the attitude towards them, different opinions and comments on them). This can be explained by the fact that the external sources of information had roughly equal influence on the Azerbaijani and Armenian ones. The Armenian and Azerbaijani media audiences, despite being in different communication environments, received quite similar factual

information regarding the role of external forces. And the blocking of Internet resources in terms of this topic was not a particular obstacle.

Regarding the topic of external forces, day.az and media.az had the highest "discrepancy index" in attention with the Armenian media, trend.az having the lowest. To a certain extent, this indirect indicator (see tables) allows to conclude about the ratio of the propaganda and purely informational components in the content of the respective media. However, it was not the subject of the current monitoring.

A certain biaswas noticed in the studied media of Azerbaijan and Armenia in several aspects of coverage of the role of external forces. In November 2020 the Azerbaijani resources attached great importance to the international recognition and the celebration of their victory in the 44-Day War. Therefore, they consistently covered the endorsements of representatives of foreign countries and international organizations regarding the agreements signed by the leaders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation on November 9, exposing them as support to the military solution to the Karabagh issue by the international community. Meanwhile, the Armenian media often neglected such statements, showing greater interest in announcements from outside regarding the problems caused by the war, which, in their turn, did not receive wide coverage in Azerbaijan. As a result, blocking websites played a certain role in the audience's full perception of the nature of external reactions to what happened.

Among external factors the Azerbaijani media paid special attention to the role of Turkey and further strengthening of cooperation between Baku and Ankara in political, military, information, cultural, educational and other fields following the 44-Day War. However, the fact that the Armenian media had limited interest in this topic hardly prevented the local audience from adequately assessing the degree of proximity between Azerbaijan and Turkey. And blocking sites did not play a significant role in this.

The monitoring team recorded a less radical discrepancy in attention to the events disseminated in the media of the two countries on the topic **"DIPLOMATIC PROCESSES OVER THE CONFLICT",** which appeared to be the third in terms of intensity of coverage. The discrepancy here during all three monitoring stages remained within 35-40%. As for the discrepancies in the interpretation of events, there were very few of them. At the second and third stages, not a single such discrepancy was recorded. These indicators suggest that both Azerbaijani and Armenian online media relied on the same sources of information. That is why the negative impact of website blocking was less tangible for audience awareness.

Among individual media in Azerbaijan, with regards to this topic, vesti.az and media.az recorded the highest "discrepancy index" in attention with Armenian resources. Namely, at the first (the height of hostilities) and the third (a few months after the end of the war) stages of monitoring, the highest "discrepancy index" was recorded on media.az, and at the second stage (the last days of the war and the subsequent period) - on vesti.az. For the rest outlets this indicator was almost the same.

When reporting on the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, which de-jure remains the main format of the settlement, the Azerbaijani and Armenian media formulated differently their expectations from the mediating role of the Minsk Group. In Azerbaijan they expected the Co-Chairs to make efforts to establish a peaceful life in the region following the war, while in Armenia they hoped to intensify MG activities in determining the status of Nagorno-Karabagh. However, even in this case, it is difficult to talk about substantial

consequences of blocking sites for the audience to get a well-founded picture, since the Minsk Group itself has not yet set the priorities of its mediating mission after the 44-Day War.

The coverage of **THE TOPIC OF PRISONERS OF WAR** in different periods of monitoring differed radically. In October 2020, when the hostilities were at their height, discrepancy in attention to various episodes and events in the studied Azerbaijani and Armenian media was recorded in more than half of the cases. In the period from 1 to 30 November, 2020, which mostly fell on the post-war development of the situation, when the issue of POWs became particularly important, there was discrepancy in more than three-quarters of the cases. And in April 2021, this indicator changed significantly, and there was discrepancy in slightly over one quarter of the cases. Though the numbers reflecting the coverage of this topic are relatively small, and it is hard enough to make conclusions on the patterns and trends. Only one thingis quite clear: the audiences of the two countries, due to the detention of the prisoners of war, mainly by the Azerbaijani side, were interested in different aspects of the problem of POWs and other detained persons. The blocking of Internet resources could play a certain role in this, especially in the period of active hostilities, when the sources on which the media relied significantly differed. Later, however, the media found opportunities to satisfy their audience's diverse interest on the matter.

The Azerbaijani media paid particular attention to the topic of prisoners of war immediately after the signing of the November 9 Statement. Their focus, as in the years preceding the 44-Day War, was on Russian citizen Dilgam Asgarov and Azerbaijani citizen Shahbaz Guliyev, who, according to the Azerbaijani side, aiming to visit the graves of their relatives in July 2014ended up in Kelbajar region controlled by the Armenian forces and were taken hostage. The Armenian version is that they were saboteurs, who killed an Armenian boy who had noticed them, they were captured and sentenced by the NK court to 22 years in prison. Therefore, the transfer of these two persons to the Azerbaijani side as part of the post-war exchange of POW striggered great enthusiasm in Azerbaijan. In Armenian society and the media, the transfer of these convicts was considered by the majority as an unacceptable concession.

After the Azerbaijani side received all its prisoners of war and, above all, Dilgam Asgarov and Shahbaz Guliyev, the media of this country to a large extent lost interest in the topic, except, the period of court trials on some of the detained Armenian military servicemen. At the same time for the Armenian media and the public, given Azerbaijan's continuing retention of Armenian soldiers and civilians, this is still one of the most pressing issues. And this discrepancy in the coverage of the topic, as noted above, only to a small extent is conditioned by the blocking of websites.

Almost the same can be said about the coverage of such topics as the **DEPLOYMENT AND STATUS OF THE PEACEKEEPING CONTINGENT** and the **UNBLOCKING OF TRANSPORT COMMUNICATIONS**, with an only difference that in October 2020 these issues had not yet acquired relevance or were not touched upon at all, or they received minimal attention. The topic of Russian peacekeepers gained momentum especiallyin the second monitoring period (November 1-30, 2020), and the prospects for opening transport communications - in the third period (April 1-30, 2020), when the trilateral Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian commission on the issue was already operating.In the last two study stages, the interpretation of the relevant episodes and events coincided either fully or in the overwhelming majority of cases. This indicates that, regardless of the blocking, both the Azerbaijani and Armenian media used common sources outside the two countries, and

also that the presentation of "dry facts" by the Azerbaijani and Armenian sources was practically identical. And the discrepancies related only to the assessment of episodes and events.

One of the differences in the coverage of the topic of transport communications by the Azerbaijani and Armenian media is the degree and nature of attention to the so-called "Meghri Corridor". In Azerbaijan, it was presented as one of the main achievements of the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyevin the process of negotiations on the Statement of November 9, 2020. In Armenia, this point of the Statement is considered by many as a threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. In general, it can be said that the Azerbaijani media and officials, are more inclined to speak out about the details of the negotiation process(which are still not fully clear to the public in Armenia) than the Armenian media and officials.Consequently, all sorts of conspiracy theories emerge, which is also to a certain extent a result of the blocking of sites.

At the second stage of monitoring (November 1-30, 2020), the Azerbaijani media quite intensively discussed the possibility of Turkey's active involvement in the peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabagh. There were even assumptions that it would be a joint Russian-Turkish mission. Publications of this kind stopped only after the creation of the Russian-Turkish monitoring center, which implied a rather limited formal status of Ankara in the process of maintaining peace in the region. But while the topic still remained relevant,it appeared in the Armenian information space in quite limited portions, which may also to a certain degree be considered a consequence of the blocking of sites.

Added to that, the Azerbaijani media, unlike the Armenian ones, reported lots of details about the process of deployment of Russian peacekeepers, their armaments, logistical support, and the anticipated unofficial mandate. However, here the discrepancy of interests in such information is conditioned not by the blocking of Azerbaijani websites, which found this information themselves mainly in Russian sources, but by the fact that the Armenian society was more interested just in strong presence of Russian peacekeepers, rather than the details related to it.

The **TOPIC OF BORDER AREAS** was very superficially reflected in this study, since based on the monitoring methodology, publications in five Azerbaijani media and the coincidence in attention to facts and their interpretation in five Armenian media were monitored. And since, unlike the Armenian media, the Azerbaijani media very rarely touched upon the topic of border territories, it is difficult to talk about the differences in the use of sources and the role of blocking Internet resources for informing the audience. At the same time, based on the data obtained through monitoring, it can be concluded that, unlike other topics selected for the study, the sources could not objectively be common and the data obtained through them were not to coincide. Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani media looked at the border areas from their own perspective. And taking into account the significantly different importance of the topic for the two audiences, conditioned by the post-war territorial realities, the Armenian media covered the topic with much greater interest and thoroughness. Accordingly, the blocking of Azerbaijani Internet resources could not play an important role for the coverage of the topic in the Armenian media.

As with the ceasefire initiatives of October 2020, the sides blame each other for the occasional hotbeds of tension on the border. And this, of course, is not connected with blocking sites either, but rather with the priorities of official propaganda.

Overall, however, taking into consideration the coverage of the entire range of topics one way or another connected with the Azerbaijani-Armenian relations at current stage, the monitoring results allow to conclude that the Azerbaijani and Armenian media use a significantly different set of events, facts and episodes when covering a number of problems. And in this sense, the blocking of Internet resources resulted in limited awareness of the audiences and a one-sided perception of reality. As the monitoring results show, this, first of all, concerned the course of one of the main topics of the study, namely the hostilities during the 44-Day War.

THE TABLES OF MONITORING
PRIMERY DATA

	1. The course of hostilities									
N.	Media	October 1-31, 2020			November 1-30, 2020			April 1-30, 2021		
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces)/% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Total (Azerbaijani pieces)	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Total (Azerbaijani pieces)	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)
1.	vesti.az	557	6	99	216	32	17	39	12	1
		452 (81.1%)	105		167 (77.3%)	49		26 (66.7%)	13	
2.	media.az	330	40	58	108	21	8	11	4	1
		232 (70.3%)	98		79 (73.1%)	29		6 (54.5%)	5	
3.	day.az	304	33	60	116	34	12	17	6	1
		211 (69.4%)	93		70 (60.3%)	46		10 (58.8%)	7	
4.	report.az	396	20	93	141	29	20	5	4	0
		283 (71.5%)	113		92 (65.2%)	49		1 (20%)	4	
5.	trend.az	313	22	90	97	6	20	1	1	0
		201 (64.2%)	112		71 (73.2%)	26		0 (100%)	1	
	Total	1900	121	400	678	122	77	73	27	3
		1379 (72.6%)	521		479 (70.6%)	199		43 (58.9%)	30	

N.	Media	October 1-31, 2020			November 1-30, 2020			April 1-30, 2021		
		2. The diplomatic process over Nagorno-Karabagh (statements, reference to the formats of settlement and the possibilities of solution)								
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces)/% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*
1.	vesti.az	55	30	2	60	26	0	9	7	0
		23 (41.8%)	*32*		*34 (56.7%)*	*26*		*2 (22.2%)*	*7*	
2.	media.az	70	31	0	40	31	0	12	6	0
		39 (55.7%)	*31*		*9 (22.5%)*	*31*		*6 (50%)*	*6*	
3.	day.az	58	35	1	35	28	0	8	5	0
		22 (37.9%)	*36*		*7 (20%)*	*28*		*3 (37.5%)*	*5*	
4.	report.az	84	49	3	47	34	0	21	13	0
		32 (38.1%)	*52*		*13 (27.6%)*	*34*		*8 (38.1%)*	*13*	
5.	trend.az	82	58	0	43	29	0	11	7	0
		24 (29.3%)	*58*		*14 (32.6%)*	*29*		*4 (36.4%)*	*7*	
	Total	349	203	6	225	148	0	61	38	0
		140 (40.1%)	*209*		*77 (34.2%)*	*148*		*23 (37.7%)*	*38*	

N.	Media	October 1-31, 2020			November 1-30, 2020			April 1-30, 2021		
		3. The issues of prisoners of war and other detained persons								
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces)/% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*
1.	vesti.az	10	0	3	6	0	0	3	1	0
		7 (70%)	*3*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*2 (66.7%)*	*1*	
2.	media.az	4	2	1	2	0	0	4	3	0
		1 (25%)	*3*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*1 (25%)*	*3*	
3.	day.az	8	1	4	10	4	0	4	4	0
		3 (37.5%)	*5*		*6 (60%)*	*4*		*0 (100%)*	*4*	
4.	report.az	10	6	1	8	2	0	9	7	0
		3 (30%)	*7*		*6 (75%)*	*2*		*2 (22.2%)*	*7*	
5.	trend.az	6	2	1	5	1	0	2	1	0
		3 (50%)	*3*		*4 (80%)*	*1*		*1 (50%)*	*1*	
	Total	38	11	10	31	7	0	22	16	0
		17 (44.7%)	*21*		*24 (77.4%)*	*7*		*6 (27.3%)*	*16*	

N.	Media	4. The prospects for opening transport communicactions								
		October 1-31, 2020			November 1-30, 2020			April 1-30, 2021		
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces)/% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Total (Azerbaijani pieces)	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Total (Azerbaijani pieces)	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)
1.	vesti.az	5	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*	
2.	media.az	0	0	0	8	1	0	7	6	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*7 (87.5%)*	*1*		*1 (14.3%)*	*6*	
3.	day.az	0	0	0	4	1	0	4	3	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*3 (75%)*	*1*		*1 (25%)*	*3*	
4.	report.az	0	0	0	4	3	0	8	7	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*1 (25%)*	*3*		*1 (12.5%)*	*7*	
5.	trend.az	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	3	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*1 (25%)*	*3*	
	Total	5	0	0	19	5	0	25	19	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*14 (73.7%)*	*5*		*6 (24%)*	*19*	

N.	Media	October 1-31, 2020			November 1-30, 2020			April 1-30, 2021		
		5. The activities and status of peacekeepers								
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces) /% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*
1.	vesti.az	0	0	0	43	25	3	8	2	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*15 (34.9%)*	*28*		*6 (75%)*	*2*	
2.	media.az	2	2	0	56	50	0	0	0	0
		0 (100%)	*2*		*6 (10.7%)*	*50*		*0 (0%)*	*0*	
3.	day.az	4	3	0	61	53	0	2	1	1
		1 (25%)	*3*		*8 (13.1%)*	*53*		*0 (100%)*	*2*	
4.	report.az	1	1	0	35	30	0	3	3	0
		0 (100%)	*1*		*5 (14.3%)*	*30*		*0 (100%)*	*3*	
5.	trend.az	1	1	0	17	14	0	0	0	0
		0 (100%)	*1*		*3 (17.6%)*	*14*		*0 (0%)*	*0*	
	Total	8	7	0	212	172	3	13	6	1
		1 (12.5%)	*7*		*37 (17.4%)*	*175*		*6 (0.5%)*	*7*	

13

N.	Media	6. The interference and role of external forces, the topic of mercenaries								
		October 1-31, 2020			November 1-30, 2020			April 1-30, 2021		
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces)/% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Total (Azerbaijani pieces)	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Total (Azerbaijani pieces)	Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)	Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)
1.	vesti.az	132	46	12	93	38	1	18	9	0
		74 (56.1%)	58		54 (58.1%)	39		9 (50%)	9	
2.	media.az	106	31	7	81	37	2	10	3	0
		68 (64.2%)	38		42 (51.8%)	39		7 (70%)	3	
3.	day.az	92	27	6	81	47	0	17	3	1
		59 (64.1%)	33		34 (42%)	47		13 (76.5%)	4	
4.	report.az	67	30	6	35	23	1	3	2	0
		31 (46.3%)	36		11 (31.4%)	24		1 (33.3%)	2	
5.	trend.az	44	20	7	31	23	0	4	3	0
		17 (38.6%)	27		8 (25.8%)	23		1 (25%)	3	
	Total	441	154	38	321	168	4	52	20	1
		249 (56.5%)	192		149 (46.4%)	172		31 (59.6%)	21	

N.	Media	7. The tension and clashes in border areas								
		October 1-31, 2020			**November 1-30, 2020**			**April 1-30, 2021**		
		Total (Az. pieces) Total (Az. pieces)/% of absence of reference in Arm. websites	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Total (Azerbaijani pieces)*	*Coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*	*Not coinciding (5 Armenian websites)*
1.	vesti.az	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*0 (100%)*	*0*	
2.	media.az	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	0	2
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (100%)*	*1*		*2 (50%)*	*2*	
3.	day.az	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*0 (100%)*	*1*	
4.	report.az	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (100%)*	*1*		*0 (100%)*	*1*	
5.	trend.az	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*		*0 (0%)*	*0*	
	Total	0	0	0	2	2	0	8	1	3
		0 (0%)	*0*		*0 (100%)*	*2*		*4 (50%)*	*4*	