



**REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM THE
SECOND MONITORING
OF OPINIONS IN ARMENIAN MEDIA
AND EXPERT COMMUNITY REGARDING
ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
RELATIONS AND CONFLICT**

PROCESS DYNAMICS

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PROJECT GOAL AND METHODOLOGY

The goal of this project component is to understand how the Armenian media and expert community continue to cover and discuss Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, **to gain insights into the dynamics** that will enable Yerevan Press Club to advance in joint efforts with media platforms and experts on the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The following **methodology** was used: through the monitoring carried out by Yerevan Press Club it was revealed how frequently the nine Armenian media, selected based on preliminary expert consultations, covered the following topics related to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations:

1. *Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations (in various official formats), assessment of their effectiveness and prospects.*
2. *Border issues between the two countries.*
3. *Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission.*
4. *The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh.*
5. *Unblocking of communications.*

The monitoring also revealed the most frequently voiced opinions on the mentioned topics: positive (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement / +), negative (not seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement / -), neutral (the possibility of reaching an agreement is presented in a vague manner / 0).

In the course of the monitoring of the nine media, speeches by Armenian experts, news, articles, and editorials on the five mentioned topics were studied.

The monitoring was carried out **from March 1 to March 31, 2024**. The following media were studied:

1. *1in.Am (video)*
2. *24 News (video)*
3. *Azatutyun (video)*
4. *Aravot (video and text)*
5. *Noyan Tapan (video)*
6. *First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia (video)*
7. *CivilNet (video)*
8. *Factor TV (video)*
9. *News.Am (video and text)*

Throughout the monitoring, articles, interviews, talk shows, and other formats were considered. Each publication was viewed as a distinct piece, during which, however, the guest (expert) could touch upon several of the five specified topics.

The data for the above-mentioned nine media are presented in varying orders in the following tables:

1. *According to the number of pieces published in these nine media (Table No. 1).*
2. *According to the frequency of statements in favor of the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage) - media in the green zone (Table No. 2).*
3. *According to the frequency of statements against the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage) - media in the red zone (Table No. 3).*

4. According to the frequency of statements, irrespective of the existence or absence of possibilities of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage) - media in the yellow zone (Table No. 4).
5. According to the frequency of statements in favor of the possibility of reaching an agreement and without specifically highlighting the existence or absence of such possibilities (aggregate indicator of the green and yellow zones - measured by percentage) - media in the blue zone (Table No. 5).

FINDINGS FROM THE ARMENIAN MEDIA MONITORING

1. MEDIA

The monitoring of the Armenian media, conducted from March 1 to March 31, 2024, recorded **794 publications** related to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the conflict. The **five topics** mentioned above **were addressed 1,178 times** within these publications (see **Table No. 1**).

Table No. 1

№	Name of the media (publication format)	Number of pieces	Number of references to the thematic sections		
1.	Aravot (video and text)	268	387		
			+ / 25 (6.5%)	- / 182 (47%)	0 / 180 (46.5%)
2.	First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia (video)	132	175		
			+ / 32 (18.3%)	- / 16 (9.1%)	0 / 127 (72.6%)
3.	Azatutyun (video)	118	156		
			+ / 9 (5.8%)	- / 57 (36.5%)	0 / 90 (57.7%)
4.	News.Am (video and text)	77	95		
			+ / 13 (13.7%)	- / 52 (54.7%)	0 / 30 (31.6%)
5.	24 News (video)	52	120		
			+ / 0 (0%)	- / 81 (67.5%)	0 / 39 (32.5%)
6.	Factor TV (video)	51	86		
			+ / 0 (0%)	- / 37 (43%)	0 / 49 (57%)
7.	1in.Am (video)	39	65		
			+ / 4 (6.1%)	- / 7 (10.8%)	0 / 54 (83.1%)
8.	Noyan Tapan (video)	38	62		
			+ / 5 (8.1%)	- / 9 (14.5%)	0 / 48 (77.4%)
9.	CiviilNet (video)	19	32		
			+ / 2 (6.3%)	- / 18 (56.2%)	0 / 12 (37.5%)
Total		794	1 178		
			+ / 90 (7.6%)	- / 459 (39%)	0 / 629 (53.4%)

Table No. 2

Media in the green zone					
№	Name of the media (publication format)	Number of references to the thematic sections			Number of pieces
		<i>Most often, the voiced opinions allowed for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>			
1.	First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia (video)	175			132
		+ / 32 (18.3%)	- / 16 (9.1%)	0 / 127 (72.6%)	
2.	News.Am (video and text)	95			77
		+ / 13 (13.7%)	- / 52 (54.7%)	0 / 30 (31.6%)	
3.	Noyan Tapan (video)	62			38
		+ / 5 (8.1%)	- / 9 (14.5%)	0 / 48 (77.4%)	
4.	Aravot (video and text)	387			268
		+ / 25 (6.5%)	- / 182 (47%)	0 / 180 (46.5%)	
5.	CivilNet (video)	32			19
		+ / 2 (6.3%)	- / 18 (56.2%)	0 / 12 (37.5%)	
6.	1in.Am (video)	65			39
		+ / 4 (6.1%)	- / 7 (10.8%)	0 / 54 (83.1%)	
7.	Azatutyun (video)	156			118
		+ / 9 (5.8%)	- / 57 (36.5%)	0 / 90 (57.7%)	
8.	Factor TV (video)	86			51
		+ / 0 (0%)	- / 37 (43%)	0 / 49 (57%)	
9.	24 News (video)	120			52
		+ / 0 (0%)	- / 81 (67.5%)	0 / 39 (32.5%)	

Table No. 3

Media in the red zone					
№	Name of the media (publication format)	Number of references to the thematic sections			Number of pieces
		<i>Most often, the voiced opinions did not allow for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>			
1.	24 News (video)	120			52
		- / 81 (67.5%)	+ / 0 (0%)	0 / 39 (32.5%)	
2.	CivilNet (video)	32			19
		- / 18 (56.2%)	+ / 2 (6.3%)	0 / 12 (37.5%)	
3.	News.Am (video and text)	95			77
		- / 52 (54.7%)	+ / 13 (13.7%)	0 / 30 (31.6%)	
4.	Aravot (video and text)	387			268
		- / 182 (47%)	+ / 25 (6.5%)	0 / 180 (46.5%)	
5.	Factor TV (video)	86			51
		- / 37 (43%)	+ / 0 (0%)	0 / 49 (57%)	
6.	Azatutyun (video)	156			118
		- / 57 (36.5%)	+ / 9 (5.8%)	0 / 90 (57.7%)	
7.	Noyan Tapan (video)	62			38
		- / 9 (14.5%)	+ / 5 (8.1%)	0 / 48 (77.4%)	
8.	1in.Am (video)	65			39
		- / 7 (10.8%)	+ / 4 (6.1%)	0 / 54 (83.1%)	
9.	First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia (video)	175			132
		- / 16 (9.1%)	+ / 32 (18.3%)	0 / 127 (72.6%)	

Table No. 4

Media in the yellow zone					
№	Name of the media (publication format)	Number of references to the thematic sections			Number of pieces
		<i>Most often, the voiced opinions did not specifically highlight the existence or absence of possibilities of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>			
1.	1in.Am (video)	65			39
		0 / 54 (83.1%)	+ / 4 (6.1%)	- / 7 (10.8%)	
2.	Noyan Tapan (video)	62			38
		0 / 48 (77.4%)	+ / 5 (8.1%)	- / 9 (14.5%)	
3.	First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia (video)	175			132
		0 / 127 (72.6%)	+ / 32 (18.3%)	- / 16 (9.1%)	
4.	Azatutyun (video)	156			118
		0 / 90 (57.7%)	+ / 9 (5.8%)	- / 57 (36.5%)	
5.	Factor TV (video)	86			51
		0 / 49 (57%)	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 37 (43%)	
6.	Aravot (video and text)	387			268
		0 / 180 (46.5%)	+ / 25 (6.5%)	- / 182 (47%)	
7.	CivilNet (video)	32			19
		0 / 12 (37.5%)	+ / 2 (6.3%)	- / 18 (56.2%)	
8.	24 News (video)	120			52
		0 / 39 (32.5%)	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 81 (67.5%)	
9.	News.Am (video and text)	95			77
		0 / 30 (31.6%)	+ / 13 (13.7%)	- / 52 (54.7%)	

Table No. 5

Media in the blue zone				
№	Name of the media (publication format)	Number of references to the thematic sections		Number of pieces
		<i>Most often, the voiced opinions allowed for the possibility of reaching an agreement and did not specifically highlight the existence or absence of such possibilities (aggregate indicator of the green and yellow zones - measured as a percentage relative to the total)</i>		
1.	First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia (video)	175		132
		0 / 159 (90.9%)	- / 16 (9.1%)	
2.	1in.Am (video)	65		39
		0 / 58 (89.2%)	- / 7 (10.8%)	
3.	Noyan Tapan (video)	62		38
		0 / 53 (85.5%)	- / 9 (14.5%)	
4.	Azatutyun (video)	156		118
		0 / 99 (63.5%)	- / 57 (36.5%)	
5.	Factor TV (video)	86		51
		0 / 49 (57%)	- / 37 (43%)	
6.	Aravot (video and text)	387		268
		0 / 205 (53%)	- / 182 (47%)	
7.	News.Am (video and text)	95		77
		0 / 43 (45.3%)	- / 52 (54.7%)	
8.	CivilNet (video)	32		19
		0 / 14 (43.8%)	- / 18 (56.2%)	
9.	24 News (video)	120		52
		0 / 39 (32.5%)	- / 81 (67.5%)	

Conclusions

1. The main conclusion is that the monitored Armenian media generally covered Armenian-Azerbaijani relations more positively and less negatively compared to June-July of last year, when the first monitoring was carried out.

It is also important to highlight that this dynamics was observed despite the well-known events in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, as a result of which more than 100 thousand Armenians were forced to leave their homes.

While last year **6.9%** of mentionings about Armenian-Azerbaijani relations in the ten monitored media were positive, and **42.8%** were negative, this year the figures are as follows: **7.6%** of mentionings in nine media are positive, and **39%** are negative.

An important question arises: what has caused such dynamics? Possibly, there are two factors: firstly, the relatively calm situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for many months. Secondly, for various reasons, ideas about a new model of relations with Azerbaijan are gradually being shaped within the Armenian society.

2. Despite the processes related to Azerbaijan remaining the primary challenge for Armenia's security, there is still uneven coverage of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations in the Armenian media. Similar to last year, around one-third of all mentionings fall to three media, although the composition of this trio has changed.

If in 2023 two media among the "leaders" stood out for predominantly presenting opposition views and approaches to the current government of Armenia, this year the trio is equally divided, with one being conditionally oppositional, one being pro-government and the third maintaining a relatively neutral stance.

In the case of the "leaders," a positive shift has also been observed. The monitoring carried out in June-July 2023 revealed that in the top three media where Armenian-Azerbaijani relations were most frequently covered (352 publications and 436 references or 65.6% of the total number of publications), **7.8%** of publications were positive and **43.3%** were negative. In March 2024, in the top three media (518 publications and 718 references or 65.2% of the total number of publications), **9.2%** of publications were positive and **35.5%** were negative.

3. Nevertheless, the favorable dynamics in terms of increasing the share of positivity in overall media coverage compared to the previous monitoring is apparent.

As noted above, there has been a change in the composition of the top three media in terms of coverage, with the First Channel of the Public Television of Armenia now leading the list (last year held by Factor TV).

Last year, **13.9%** of all references from the leader of the green zone were positive, while this year, the PTA First Channel recorded **18.3%**. It is noteworthy that compared to the last year, the number of positive references from this media nearly doubled (the figure was **9.4%** last year).

Meanwhile, it is worth highlighting that there has been a significant drop in the number of positive references in all those media that cover in a positive light the prospect of

Armenia's integration with Western structures ("Factor TV", "Azatutyun", and "1in.Am"). The most vivid example is "Factor TV", where there were no positive references to the topic in March of this year. To a certain extent, this is explained by a more in-depth consideration of the settlement issue and the withdrawal of the process from Western negotiation platforms.

4. Despite a slight decrease in its negative coverage, "24 News" maintained its lead in the group of media covering Armenian-Azerbaijani relations predominantly negatively. In March 2024 their negative coverage amounted to **67.5%**, while it stood at **69.4%** according to the results of the previous monitoring.

Among the top three in this group, two positions have changed. CivilNet displayed the most significant shift, moving to second place in terms of negativity percentage (**56.2%**), up from eighth place (**39.1%**) in 2023.

There are still high negative indicators in the media, characterized by three peculiarities: their association with the former authorities of Armenia, sharp criticism of the current government of Armenia, relatively frequent endorsements of stronger Armenian-Russian relations, as well as reflection of the Kremlin's stance on regional and international processes.

5. The "yellow" group has seen the least changes in composition, although the leader has changed here too. "1in.Am" has taken the top spot with **83.1%** this year (its percentage last year was **60.1%**, placing it in fourth position).

Here as well, "CivilNet" not only fell out of the top three, but also dropped from third place to seventh.

It should be noted that the leading media of this group, similar to last year, are the ones where relevant targeted efforts within this project can yield positive outcomes: in particular, they can be viewed as a resource for presenting positions and perspectives in favor of constructive dialogue between the two countries.

6. Interestingly, the composition of the top three in the "blue zone" has remained unchanged, with "1in.Am" moving from third to second position. The PTA First Channel continues to lead with **90.9%** (last year the figure stood at **87.5%**).

2. THEMATIC SECTIONS

The Monitoring of nine Armenian media in March 2024 showed that the five thematic categories outlined for the study were addressed **1,178 times**. Neutral positions were the most prevalent (**53.4%**), followed by negative (skeptical) opinions (**39%**), with positive (optimistic) approaches comprising only **7.6%** of the total (see **Table No. 6**).

In March of this year, the media studied focused most frequently on the topic of “Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission,” accounting for 320 times or **27.2%** of the total. Despite the absence of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations involving mediators during the monitoring period, there was active coverage of discussions concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and the presence of European observers in Armenia.

According to the 2023 monitoring results, “Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations” were ranked first, while in March 2024 they dropped to fourth place. It is worth noting that in the recent period negotiations between the two countries almost entirely revolved around border delimitation, with little attention given to other aspects of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. This shift likely explains the reduced attention to this thematic section. As for border-related issues, interest in them has understandably increased, securing second place in 2024, with 280 references or **23.8%** of the total.

Similar to 2023, the topic of “Unblocking of communications” received the least attention, with 83 references or **7%** (even less than last year’s **9.2%**). This indicates the lack of tangible progress in resolving this issue, crucial for normalizing relations. Ultimately, the opening of communications entails development of economic ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan and establishment of shared interests between the two states.

Table No. 6

№	Thematic sections	Number of references to the thematic sections		
1.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	320		
		+ / 31 (9.7%)	- / 64 (20%)	0 / 225 (70.3%)
2.	Border issues between the two countries	280		
		+ / 8 (2.8%)	- / 150 (53.6%)	0 / 122 (43.6%)
3.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	269		
		+ / 1 (0.4%)	- / 167 (62.1%)	0 / 101 (37.5%)
4.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	226		
		+ / 37 (16.4%)	- / 70 (31%)	0 / 119 (52.6%)
5.	Unblocking of communications	83		
		+ / 13 (15.7%)	- / 8 (9.6%)	0 / 62 (74.7%)
Total		1 178		
		+ / 90 (7.6%)	- / 459 (39%)	0 / 629 (53.4%)

The above-mentioned five topics are presented in three additional tables:

1. Topics, regarding which the voiced opinions most often allowed for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage) - topics in the **green zone** (Table No. 7).
2. Topics, regarding which the voiced opinions most often did not allow for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage) - topics in the **red zone** (Table No. 8).
3. Topics, regarding which the voiced opinions most often did not specifically highlight the existence or absence of possibilities of reaching an agreement, or the statements were vague (measured by percentage)- topics in the **yellow zone** (Table No. 9).

Table No. 7

Green zone			
№	Thematic sections	Thematic sections	
		Number of references to the thematic sections	
<i>Most often, the voiced opinions allowed for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>			
1.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	226	
		+ / 37 (16.4%)	- / 70 (31%)
2.	Unblocking of communications	83	
		+ / 13 (15.7%)	- / 8 (9.6%)
3.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	320	
		+ / 31 (9.7%)	- / 64 (20%)
4.	Border issues between the two countries	280	
		+ / 8 (2.8%)	- / 150 (53.6%)
5.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	269	
		+ / 1 (0.4%)	- / 167 (62.1%)

Table No. 8

Red zone			
№	Thematic sections	Thematic sections	
		Number of references to the thematic sections	
<i>Most often, the voiced opinions did not allow for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>			
1.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	269	
		- / 167 (62.1%)	+ / 1 (0.4%)
2.	Border issues between the two countries	280	
		- / 150 (53.6%)	+ / 8 (2.8%)
3.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	226	
		- / 70 (31%)	+ / 37 (16.4%)
4.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	320	
		- / 64 (20%)	+ / 31 (9.7%)
5.	Unblocking of communications	83	
		- / 8 (9.6%)	+ / 13 (15.7%)
		0 / 101 (37.5%)	
		0 / 122 (43.6%)	
		0 / 119 (52.6%)	
		0 / 225 (70.3%)	
		0 / 62 (74.7%)	

Table No. 9

Yellow zone			
№	Thematic sections	Thematic sections	
		Number of references to the thematic sections	
<i>Most often, the voiced opinions did not specifically highlight the existence or absence of possibilities of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>			
1.	Unblocking of communications	83	
		0 / 62 (74.7%)	+ / 13 (15.7%)
2.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	320	
		0 / 225 (70.3%)	+ / 31 (9.7%)
3.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	226	
		0 / 119 (52.6%)	+ / 37 (16.4%)
4.	Border issues between the two countries	280	
		0 / 122 (43.6%)	+ / 8 (2.8%)
5.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	269	
		0 / 101 (37.5%)	+ / 1 (0.4%)
			- / 8 (9.6%)
			- / 64 (20%)
			- / 70 (31%)
			- / 150 (53.6%)
			- / 167 (62.1%)

Conclusions

Similar to 2023, the topic of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations remained the most positively received among the five thematic sections, accounting for **16.4%** of the total number of references. There has been a positive dynamics observed here, as last year this figure stood at **11.9%**.

Just like last year, the policy of Baku and Yerevan towards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue drew the most skepticism, accounting for **62.1%** of the total number of references. In the previous monitoring results, this figure was slightly higher at **66.2%**.

The topic of unblocking of transport communications received the most neutral references, accounting for **74.7%** (last year this figure stood at **65.8%**).

It is noteworthy that the “leaders” in all three categories have remained unchanged compared to the previous monitoring results. This likely reflects the objective state of affairs: the main expectations and apprehensions associated with Azerbaijan in the Armenian society have remained stable, despite an overall slight positive dynamics:

- the topic of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations received **more positive** comments than last year;
- the topic of the policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh received **fewer negative** comments than last year.

The fact that positive statements regarding the negotiations with Azerbaijan rose by nearly half (from **11.9%** to **16.4%**) could indicate a slight increase in the Armenian public’s interest in developing a new model of relations with its neighbor, moving away from a state of permanent conflict.

It is not surprising that the developments related to Nagorno-Karabakh received the most negative attitudes, particularly due to the events of September 2023 and their consequences.

It should also be highlighted that neutral references regarding the opening of communications have become more frequent. Furthermore, this topic ranked second in terms of positive references, following the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. Considering the context in which the issue of communications was discussed, it can be assumed that the prospects for a positive “breakthrough” in dialogue on this matter are directly linked to the decline of Russian influence in the region. Many in Armenia view Moscow as advocating for the idea of extraterritoriality of the Meghri road, and with the diminishing relevance of this idea, the prospect of Baku and Yerevan reaching an agreement on opening communications appears more realistic.

The monitoring findings (particularly regarding the topics of the negotiation process and determination of boundaries) also allow us to conclude that in expert dialogues it is crucial not to avoid addressing issues that provoke the most acute contradictions. The opportunity to hear each other’s arguments facilitates the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

3. EXPERTS

The **13 Armenian experts** who were the focus of the study appeared in **66 media pieces**, where they addressed the five thematic sections **111 times**.

The topic of “Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission” received the most attention from them, with 46 references (**41.1%** of the total number of references). The topic of “Unblocking of communications” received the least attention (6 times or **5.4%**).

Regarding the five topics, Armenian experts voiced **positive (optimistic) opinions 3 times** (in only **2.7%** of cases **seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement / +** , compared to **8.8%** in 2023), **negative (pessimistic) opinions 48 times** - (in **43.2%** of cases **not seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement / -** , compared to **42.9%** last year) and **neutral** (not specifically highlighting the existence or absence of possibilities of reaching an agreement or sharing their ideas in a vague manner) **opinions 60 times** (in **54.1%** of cases **the possibility of reaching an agreement was not specifically highlighted / 0** - in 2023 this figure stood at **48.3%**).

The “ranking” **Tables No. 10, 11, 12, 13** present the topics most frequently addressed by Armenian experts, alongside the positive, negative or neutral opinions for each topic (as a percentage of the total).

Table No. 10

№	Thematic sections	Number of references by the Armenian experts to the thematic sections		
1.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	46		
		+ / 0 (0%)	- / 10 (21.7%)	0 / 36 (78.3%)
2.	Border issues between the two countries	28		
		+ / 0 (0%)	- / 19 (67.9%)	0 / 9 (32.1%)
3.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	19		
		+ / 2 (10.6%)	- / 10 (52.6%)	0 / 7 (36.8%)
4.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	12		
		+ / 0 (0%)	- / 8 (66.6%)	0 / 4 (33.4%)
5.	Unblocking of communications	6		
		+ / 1 (16.7%)	- / 1 (16.7%)	0 / 4 (66.8%)
Total		111		
		+ / 3 (2.7%)	- / 48 (43.2%)	0 / 60 (54.1%)

Table No. 11

Green zone				
№	Thematic sections	Number of references by the Armenian experts to the thematic sections		
		<i>Most often, the opinions voiced by the Armenian experts allowed for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>		
		6		
1.	Unblocking of communications	+ / 1 (16.7%)	- / 1 (16.7%)	0 / 4 (66.8%)
		19		
2.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	+ / 2 (10.6%)	- / 10 (52.6%)	0 / 7 (36.8%)
		28		
3.	Border issues between the two countries	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 19 (67.9%)	0 / 9 (32.1%)
		12		
4.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 8 (66.6%)	0 / 4 (33.4%)
		46		
5.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 10 (21.7%)	0 / 36 (78.3%)

Table No. 12

Red zone				
№	Thematic sections	Number of references by the Armenian experts to the thematic sections		
		<i>Most often, the opinions voiced by the Armenian experts did not allow for the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>		
		28		
1.	Border issues between the two countries	- / 19 (67.9%)	+ / 0 (0%)	0 / 9 (32.1%)
		12		
2.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	- / 8 (66.6%)	+ / 0 (0%)	0 / 4 (33.4%)
		19		
3.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	- / 10 (52.6%)	+ / 2 (10.6%)	0 / 7 (36.8%)
		46		
4.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	- / 10 (21.7%)	+ / 0 (0%)	0 / 36 (78.3%)
		6		
5.	Unblocking of communications	- / 1 (16.7%)	+ / 1 (16.7%)	0 / 4 (66.8%)

Table No. 13

Yellow zone				
№	Thematic sections	Number of references by the Armenian experts to the thematic sections		
		<i>Most often, in their opinions the Armenian experts did not specifically highlight the existence or absence of the possibility of reaching an agreement (measured by percentage)</i>		
1.	Assessment of the activities of mediators, peacekeepers and the observation mission	46		
		0 / 36 (78.3%)	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 10 (21.7%)
2.	Unblocking of communications	6		
		0 / 4 (66.8%)	+ / 1 (16.7%)	- / 1 (16.7%)
3.	Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, assessment of their effectiveness and prospects	19		
		0 / 7 (36.8%)	+ / 2 (10.6%)	- / 10 (52.6%)
4.	The policy of Baku and Yerevan towards Nagorno-Karabakh	12		
		0 / 4 (33.4%)	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 8 (66.6%)
5.	Border issues between the two countries	28		
		0 / 9 (32.1%)	+ / 0 (0%)	- / 19 (67.9%)

Conclusions

In fact, while the Armenian media has shown overall positive dynamics, experts have moved from optimism to a predominantly neutral assessment of the situation. Nonetheless, the study's small sample size does not allow us to draw far-reaching conclusions regarding the approaches of expert community representatives on specific thematic sections.



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