

## **ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS IN TRADITIONAL AND NEW MEDIA**

This analytical note, based on studies aimed at identifying the focus and attitude of Armenian media and social media influencers towards various aspects of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, covered the period from September 2023 to August 2024. Throughout these 12 months, the conflict between the two neighboring countries and the process of its resolution evolved continuously, going through several stages that changed the thematic focus and nature of coverage in traditional and social media. More comprehensive versions of the studies, which served as a key resource for this note, are published mainly in Armenian on the Yerevan Press Club [website](#).

In September 2023, the blockade of the part of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Armenian population and the Russian peacekeeping contingent were still present at that time, entered its final and most critical phase. On September 19-20, Azerbaijani authorities carried out a military operation in NK, causing the last ten days of the month to be marked by a mass exodus of Armenians from the region. Following this, on October 4, Azerbaijan's actions were condemned at the third European Political Community Summit, where a quadripartite (Armenia, EU, Germany, France) statement was adopted, emphasizing the need of enabling the Armenian population to return to NK. Azerbaijan refused to attend the Summit, harshly criticized the adopted statement and, in fact, rejected further participation in negotiations with Armenia under European mediation.

Tensions in the relations between the two countries appeared to show a downward trend on December 7, 2023, following the release of a joint statement from the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan and the Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia on mutual support for initiatives regarding environmental issues and climate change within the UN framework. In particular, Baku received the opportunity to host such a prestigious event as the COP29 global conference. This development was quickly interpreted by many observers as a turning point in the conflict settlement process, with some even discussing the imminent peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, less than a month later, statements from Baku started to emerge that hinted at a tightening of negotiating positions rather than a softening. Contrary to some assumptions, they were not confined solely to the snap presidential election campaign in Azerbaijan. Among other things, the demand to amend the Constitution of Armenia was clearly articulated as a prerequisite for signing a peace agreement.

The meetings initiated by Germany between Aliyev and Pashinyan at the Munich Security Conference on February 17, 2024, and between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Berlin at the end of the same month, along with the talks held in Almaty (May 2024) at the invitation of Kazakhstan's leadership did not yield any positive changes in the settlement process. The British Prime Minister's initiative to arrange another meeting between the two ministers at the fourth summit of the European Political Community in

London (July 2024), in turn, was rejected by the Armenian side. The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan did not hold any negotiations after their meeting in Munich.

Although the delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in a limited area (covering slightly over 12% of its total length) in April-July garnered a generally positive international response, the prospects for the continuation of this process remain vague. This is evidenced by the very fact that the negotiations regarding the border separating Armenia's Tavush marz from Azerbaijan's Ghazakh region began with Baku threatening to resume military actions. Furthermore, they did not follow the fundamental recommendations developed by the OSCE, the interests of local residents in the border areas were not sufficiently taken into account, and ultimately this process led to another intensification of the internal political confrontation within Armenia. And the experience of previous years indicates that tensions within countries adversely affect the resolution of external issues. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that the recent months have seen Armenian political forces engaging in intensive preparations for the 2026 parliamentary elections. The agreement reached by the parties at the end of August on the border delimitation provision is difficult to call a positive turning point, since there are grounds to interpret it as a means of solving tactical issues. In particular, it was crucial for Baku to demonstrate a peaceful attitude to secure maximum representativeness at COP29. Meanwhile, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his political team need to collect evidence, piece by piece, of at least some progress toward the "era of peace," which became a key promise for the ruling Civil Contract party during the parliamentary election campaign in 2021.

As noted above, all of the twists and turns, whether mentioned or not, that took place from September 2023 to August 2024 determined a sharp change in thematic preferences and sentiments in the media environment. The findings of the [monitoring](#) (carried out in April-May 2024 within the frames of a joint project of Yerevan Press Club and Friedrich Ebert Foundation) of publications by a number of Armenian media and influencers, became the core material for their analysis. These results, in turn, were compared with data from similar studies by YPC and its partner, Baku Press Club, as well as evaluations and opinions shared at joint Armenian-Azerbaijani discussions, along with expert observations throughout the specified 12-month period.

The methodology of the studies, empirical observations and discussions with the participation of experts mainly relied on news, analytical and discussion content from leading Armenian media (ranging from 6 to 10 in different periods) and a specific circle (ranging from 10 to 20 in different periods) of influencers in the Armenian social media segment. The frequency/intensity of references to specific aspects of the conflict, as well as the attitude (positive, negative or neutral) towards the issue raised were determined in relevant pieces (the positive attitude was understood as recognition of the possibility of reaching an agreement between the parties, while the negative attitude implied denial of such a possibility).

In April-May 2024, the main focus of both traditional media and social networks' coverage of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations centered around the border delimitation and demarcation process. More than half (*see Table 1*) of all media references to the conflict were dedicated to this issue. Notably, the publications focused on the immediate events associated with this process, with all other aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani topic being sidelined during this period. At the same time, the assessment of the process first of all in terms of prospects was mainly negative (55.47% of all references). In 25.34% of cases, it was neutral or vague, while only 19.19% of references were optimistic (*see Tables 2 and 6*).

Out of the six aspects of the conflict-related topic selected for the study, the nature of interethnic relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis received the most skepticism or pessimism in the media, with 71.43% of references assessing negatively the prospects for their improvement. And in the overwhelming majority of cases (75%), Armenophobia in Azerbaijan was cited as the primary cause. Still, against the overall backdrop, this aspect turned out to be the least addressed by the media.

In the period of April-May 2024, the topic that garnered second-highest number of references - far behind the border issue - was the choice of platforms and formats for Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. The Russian platform was the most frequently cited, followed by those of the US and the EU. The bilateral format was mentioned less often than others. At the same time, in terms of prospects, negotiations without mediators ranked just below those moderated by the US, while the platform proposed by the Russian Federation faced the highest level of skepticism.

When it came to positive expectations, the aspect of the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, particularly the possibility of signing a peace treaty, surpassed all other aspects. This allows to conclude that in the Armenian media space the settlement of the conflict at the state level is not linked to the nature of mutual perceptions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In other words, in April-May, it was assumed that the mutual aversion between the two peoples would last longer than the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the issue might have experienced certain dynamics over different time periods, fundamental changes in the approaches and sentiments circulated through most media hardly ever occur.

At the same time, significant transformations are occurring in the coverage of other aspects of the settlement: it is not only the intensity of their coverage that is undergoing changes, but also the assessments of their prospects. Thus, as highlighted earlier, in April-May, there was a certain optimism in the media landscape regarding the normalization of relations. The possibility of unblocking communications (in the overwhelming majority of cases, this included the utilization of the road through Meghri, with Armenia maintaining full sovereignty over it) was also quite highly rated in the assessments, placing third among the six aspects (see *Table 1*). However, in the following months, increasingly persistent demands from Baku to make changes in the RA Constitution as a precondition for finalizing a peace agreement, along with the official statement that the unblocking of communications was entirely removed from the agenda of negotiations, triggered a sharp increase in skepticism and pessimism in the coverage of these two aspects (see *Table 2*).

Unlike April-May, Yerevan Press Club did not conduct comprehensive monitoring (using both quantitative and qualitative methods) in the following months. However, regular empirical observations and discussions of the issue in the expert community provide sufficient grounds for the conclusions drawn above.

It should be pointed out that the prioritization of conflict aspects in the studied media (meaning the aggregate indicator) and among influencers actively engaged in the topic of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations (see *Table 5*) mostly matches. However, their opinions on the prospects for reaching an agreement between the parties differ significantly (see *Table 6*). At least, these differences were evident in the last months (April-August 2024). In particular, the prospects for unblocking communications and border delimitation are most positively viewed by influencers/experts, while in the media, greater optimism was associated with the official dialogue on the peace treaty and the use of various negotiation platforms. Nonetheless, influencers also acknowledge certain risks connected to unblocking

transport communications, leading to a fairly high percentage of negative assessments regarding these prospects, with minimal neutrality towards the issue. In other words, representatives of the expert community realize the importance of reaching agreements for Armenia's development, but see certain difficulties in terms of the practical execution of these projects.

A comparative analysis of studies and observations carried out in different periods of the last 12 months (September 2023 - August 2024) shows that there is an evident and striking contrast in the thematic priorities between the start and end of the specified period. From the beginning of September 2023, the Armenian information space focused on the problem of Karabakh Armenians and the attitude of official Baku and Yerevan towards it, including the rather painful process of leadership change in the NK government. Both the media and social media influencers attached great importance to the involvement of the international community concerning the Armenian population of NK. However, if prior to the mass exodus the references to this aspect were coupled with tracking the developments directly in Nagorno-Karabakh, then starting from October 2023, the role of external players was also covered in the context of the accommodation and status of internally displaced persons in Armenia.

In contrast to the evaluations and opinions regarding the international community's participation within the Armenian information space, a tendency to minimize external engagement in the conflict resolution was observed in Azerbaijan, especially with regard to the so-called "extra-regional actors," which was primarily understood to mean the "collective West." At the same time, a categorical rejection of France's role was highlighted, and a more accommodating stance was displayed towards the United States than the EU. This trend became particularly pronounced following the quadripartite Granada statement. However, in the subsequent months it was already tied to a wider range of issues than just the fate of Karabakh Armenians. Thus, Baku, utilizing also the media and the expert community, more and more persistently promoted the idea of dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group and refraining from extending the EU civilian observation mission along the Armenian border. Moreover, there were calls for Yerevan to back these initiatives, while the rationale for deeming the further presence of European observers inappropriate was supported by accusations (which echoed Moscow's position) that they were engaged in espionage against Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. The regulations on joint activities of the commissions for border delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, signed at the very end of August, became yet another argument and reason for Baku to raise the issue of the EU mission's functions being exhausted.

It can be distinctly emphasized that the change in the thematic priorities and assessments of settlement prospects in the information space of Armenia and Azerbaijan largely occurs in line with the dynamics of the settlement process itself, as summarized briefly at the beginning of this analytical note. At the same time, there is reason to believe that this connection may be mutual: not only do political twists and turns impact the behavior of media players, but there are certain cases when it is the media and influencers that anticipate, prepare or accompany specific transformations that are planned and carried out at the official, political level.

Overall, the 12-month period under study, as already noted, is characterized by an intensity of changes in sentiments at all levels, including the informational one. While after the September 2023 crisis and up to March 2024 at least in the Armenian media space there was observed some increase in optimism regarding the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, for the months that followed there are more grounds to talk about a

tendency towards skepticism regarding the prospects for a peace treaty. In this context, the UN COP29 conference, taking place in Baku in November of this year, is being seen less and less as a basis for rapprochement between the parties' positions.

As for the differences in the coverage of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations by different categories of Armenian media and influencers (see *Tables 3 and 4*), it is apparent that the media and experts associated with the opposition camp have a more pessimistic assessment of the processes. In contrast, those expressing views close to the government's policy assess the prospects more positively. In terms of the intensity of references to the topic, the media most strongly presenting specific political positions take the lead: "Hraparak" newspaper, which is sharply critical of Armenia's ruling circles and of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan himself, and the Public Television of Armenia, which is quite widely criticized for violating the political balance in favor of the RA authorities. Moreover, PTA particularly intensified its coverage of the Armenian-Azerbaijani topic in the second part of the period under study. This may be linked to the aforementioned assumption that the last months were marked by intensive preparations by Armenian political forces for the 2026 parliamentary elections in the country. Hence, the ruling elite is interested in a more positive sentiment among the society regarding the implementation of the peace agenda. Relatively independent media covered the processes concerning Armenian-Azerbaijani relations mainly with restraint, trying to provide different viewpoints on the possibilities of reaching an agreement between the parties to the conflict and, as a rule, avoiding radical assessments and extremes.

In comparing how the media and experts from the two countries covered the processes in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, especially after the 44-Day War, Azerbaijani researcher Rauf Garagozov's assessment seems to be the most accurate: "they use the same facts, but at the same time tell different stories." In other words, each specific event is interpreted through fixed narratives that contradict one another. As a result, the likelihood of convincing the other side in these discussions seems impossible. In particular, the narrative about Armenophobia in Azerbaijani society is widespread in the Armenian information space, whereas in the neighboring country, Turkophobia inherent in Armenians is just as commonly discussed. Overall, we can observe that there has traditionally been a strong presence of "mirrored" narratives and stereotypes in the media of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The trauma experienced adds emotional strain to the relationships between representatives of the two societies, especially in how they publicly express their perceptions of each other. Despite the common narrative that Armenians and Azerbaijanis have switched roles after the 44-Day War, both past and recent traumas shape the media discourse related to the conflict in both countries.

During the studied period, the contradictions in assessing the geopolitical situation impacting the conflict resolution process intensified. In Azerbaijan, there is a growing trend of accusing the West of taking a biased position, driven in part by the Islamophobia that Baku attributes to it. In Armenia, the responsibility for the extremely unfavorable development of the situation in recent years is placed on Russia. It should be noted, however, that the above-mentioned pluralism in the Armenian media space contributes to a rather heated debate regarding the alleged guilt of Moscow, Washington or Brussels in what happened. The certain categoricalness in the assessment of the West's positions by Azerbaijani politicians and representatives of the expert community, in turn, is probably explained not so much by deeply rooted public perceptions as by the recently created conjuncture, which may undergo adjustments depending on the further course of events.

The information environment in Azerbaijan differs from that in Armenia due to a lesser influence of electoral processes on the political rhetoric, including discussions in relation to the conflict. In the media of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the formation of ideas about the parties' motivations and positions is significantly influenced by the quite frequent involvement of foreign experts of Azerbaijani and Armenian origin. Yet, the opinions they share are far from always resonating with the sentiments of their compatriots living in their homeland. What unites the tone of the coverage of the conflict in both countries is the volatility of these sentiments, their dependence on the dynamics of official negotiations, a point highlighted above. The development of the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue, its presence in the media and at the Track 2 level also depend on the parties' finding solutions to their contradictions.

**Table No. 1**

<b>April-May 2024</b>		
<b>№</b>	<b>Topics/subtopics</b>	<b>Number of media references (percentage of total / %)</b>
1.	<i>The attitude towards the initiated process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border</i>	<b>1172 (54.30%)</b>
1.1.	Events directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	1042 (48.28%)
1.2.	Events in the border area not directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	130 (6.02%)
2.	<i>The attitude towards the platforms/format of negotiations for the peaceful settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>429 (19.83%)</b>
2.1.	With the RF mediation/engagement	145 (6.71%)
2.2.	With the EU mediation/engagement	139 (6.41%)
2.3.	With the US mediation/engagement	102 (4.73%)
2.4.	Regional format	22 (1.01%)
2.5.	Bilateral format	21 (0.97%)
3.	<i>The attitude towards the possibilities of the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>273 (12.63%)</b>
3.1.	Signing of a peace treaty	266 (12.32%)
3.2.	Establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan	4 (0.18%)
3.3.	Cooperation in economic, energy and other sectors	3 (0.13%)
4.	<i>The attitude towards the unblocking of communications</i>	<b>143 (6.62%)</b>
4.1.	“Crossroads of Peace” project	60 (2.78%)
4.2.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road under the supervision of the RF FSB border guard troops	31 (1.43%)
4.3.	Free communication between “mainland” Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan	21 (0.97%)
4.4.	Within the bounds of Armenia’s full sovereignty	12 (0.55%)
4.5.	Unblocking of “all communications” with no specification	11 (0.52%)
4.6.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road with the engagement of other international actors	8 (0.37%)
5.	<i>The RA official attitude towards the Artsakh issue</i>	<b>127 (5.98%)</b>
5.1.	Integration of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh in the RA	66 (3.05%)
5.2.	The presence of the Artsakh issue in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations	34 (1.62%)
5.3.	The rights of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh	27 (1.31%)
6.	<i>Ethnic enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis</i>	<b>14 (0.64%)</b>
6.1.	Armenophobia	12 (0.56%)

6.2.	Azerophobia	1 (0.04%)
6.3.	Turkophobia	1 (0.04%)
6.4.	Islamophobia	0 (0%)
<b>TOTAL</b>		
		<b>2158 (100%)</b>



Positive, negative and neutral reactions are categorized by colors:

- **positive (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement);**
- **negative (not seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement);**
- **neutral (the possibility of reaching an agreement appears vague).**

**Table No. 2**

<b>April-May 2024</b>			
<b>№</b>	<b>Topics/subtopics</b>	<b>Number of media references (total - 100%)</b>	
		<b>Most often, positive opinions were voiced (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement)</b>	
1.	<i>The attitude towards the possibilities of the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>273 (100%)</b>	
		<b>135 (49.45%)</b>	<b>63 (23.07%)</b>
		<b>75 (27.48%)</b>	
1.1.	Establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan	4 (100%)	
		4 (100%)	0 (0%)
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)
1.2.	Signing of a peace treaty	266 (100%)	
		130 (48.87%)	61 (22.93%)
		75 (28.20%)	
1.3.	Cooperation in economic, energy and other sectors	3 (100%)	
		1 (33.33%)	2 (66.67%)
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)
2.	<i>The attitude towards the platforms/format of negotiations for the peaceful settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>429 (100%)</b>	
		<b>206 (48.01%)</b>	<b>139 (32.40%)</b>
		<b>84 (19.59%)</b>	
2.1.	With the US mediation/engagement	102 (100%)	
		72 (70.59%)	12 (11.76%)
		18 (17.65%)	
2.2.	Bilateral format	21 (100%)	
		14 (66.67%)	3 (14.28%)
		4 (19.05%)	
2.3.	With the EU mediation/engagement	139 (100%)	
		90 (64.75%)	18 (12.94%)
		31 (22.31%)	
2.4.	Regional format	22 (100%)	
		8 (36.36%)	7 (31.82%)
		7 (31.82%)	7 (31.82%)
2.5.	With the RF mediation/engagement	145 (100%)	
		22 (15.17%)	99 (68.28%)
		24 (16.55%)	
3.	<i>The attitude towards the unblocking of communications</i>	<b>143 (100%)</b>	
		<b>64 (44.75%)</b>	<b>43 (30.07%)</b>
		<b>36 (25.18%)</b>	
3.1.	Within the bounds of Armenia's full sovereignty	12 (100%)	
		11 (91.67%)	0 (0%)
		1 (8.33%)	
3.2.	"Crossroads of Peace" project	60 (100%)	
		43 (71.67%)	6 (10%)
		11 (18.33%)	

3.3.	Unblocking of “all communications” with no specification	11 (100%)		
		5 (45.45%)	4 (36.36%)	2 (18.19%)
3.4.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road under the supervision of the RF FSB border guard troops	31 (100%)		
		5 (16.13%)	14 (45.17%)	12 (38.70%)
3.5.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road with the engagement of other international actors	8 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	3 (37.50%)	5 (62.50%)
3.6.	Free communication between “mainland” Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan	21 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	16 (76.20%)	5 (23.80%)
<b>4. The RA official attitude towards the Artsakh issue</b>				
4.	<i>The RA official attitude towards the Artsakh issue</i>	127 (100%)		
		37 (29.13%)	47 (37.00%)	43 (33.87%)
4.1.	Integration of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh in the RA	66 (100%)		
		30 (45.45%)	5 (7.57%)	31 (46.98%)
4.2.	The rights of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh	27 (100%)		
		7 (25.92%)	10 (37.04%)	10 (37.04%)
4.3.	The presence of the Artsakh issue in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations	34 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	32 (94.11%)	2 (5.89%)
<b>5. The attitude towards the initiated process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border</b>				
5.	<i>The attitude towards the initiated process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border</i>	1172 (100%)		
		225 (19.19%)	650 (55.47%)	297 (25.34%)
5.1.	Events directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	1042 (100%)		
		225 (21.59%)	600 (57.59%)	217 (20.82%)
5.2.	Events in the border area not directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	130 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	50 (38.46%)	80 (61.54%)
<b>6. Ethnic enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis</b>				
6.	<i>Ethnic enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis</i>	14 (100%)		
		1 (7.14%)	10 (71.43%)	3 (21.43%)
6.1.	Azerophobia	1 (100%)		
		1 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
6.2.	Islamophobia	0 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
6.3.	Armenophobia	12 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	9 (75%)	3 (25%)
6.4.	Turkophobia	1 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>TOTAL</b>				
		2158 (100%)		
		668 (30.96%)	952 (44.11%)	538 (24.93%)

The **green zone** of the media was formed based on the volume of **positive (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement)** references made by the six monitored Armenian media while covering the aforementioned topics of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. In other words, it indicates the percentage of the overall coverage of the topic/subtopic that was **positive (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement)**.

**Table No. 3**

<b>April-May, 2024</b>				
<b>Media in the green zone</b>				
<b>№</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Number of references (total - 100%)</b>		
		<b>Positive</b>	<b>Negative</b>	<b>Neutral</b>
1.	Public Television of Armenia	<b>455 (100%)</b>		
		<b>259</b> <b>(56.92%)</b>	<b>60</b> <b>(13.18%)</b>	<b>136</b> <b>(29.90%)</b>
2.	1in.am	<b>115 (100%)</b>		
		<b>54</b> <b>(46.96%)</b>	<b>33</b> <b>(28.70%)</b>	<b>28</b> <b>(24.34%)</b>
3.	Noyan Tapan	<b>189 (100%)</b>		
		<b>81</b> <b>(42.85%)</b>	<b>85</b> <b>(44.98%)</b>	<b>23</b> <b>(12.17%)</b>
4.	Factor.am	<b>209 (100%)</b>		
		<b>55</b> <b>(26.32%)</b>	<b>94</b> <b>(44.98%)</b>	<b>60</b> <b>(28.70%)</b>
5.	Hraparak	<b>1117 (100%)</b>		
		<b>209</b> <b>(18.71%)</b>	<b>647</b> <b>(57.92%)</b>	<b>261</b> <b>(23.37%)</b>
6.	CivilNet	<b>73 (100%)</b>		
		<b>10</b> <b>(13.70%)</b>	<b>33</b> <b>(45.20%)</b>	<b>30</b> <b>(41.10)</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>2158 (100%)</b>		
		<b>668</b> <b>(30.96%)</b>	<b>952</b> <b>(44.11%)</b>	<b>538</b> <b>(24.93%)</b>

The **red zone** of the media was formed based on the volume of **negative (not seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement)** references made by the six monitored Armenian media while covering the aforementioned topics of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. In other words, it indicates the percentage of the overall coverage of the topic/subtopic that was **negative (not seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement)**.

**Table No. 4**

<b>April-May 2024</b>				
<b>Media in the red zone</b>				
<b>№</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Number of references (Total -100%)</b>		
		<b>Negative</b>	<b>Positive</b>	<b>Neutral</b>
1.	Hraparak	<b>1117 (100%)</b>		
		<b>647 (57.92%)</b>	<b>209 (18.71%)</b>	<b>261 (23.37%)</b>
2.	CivilNet	<b>73 (100%)</b>		
		<b>33 (45.20%)</b>	<b>10 (13.70%)</b>	<b>30 (41.10)</b>
3.	Noyan Tapan	<b>189 (100%)</b>		
		<b>85 (44.98%)</b>	<b>81 (42.85%)</b>	<b>23 (12.17%)</b>
4.	Factor.am	<b>209 (100%)</b>		
		<b>94 (44.98%)</b>	<b>55 (26.32%)</b>	<b>60 (28.70%)</b>
5.	1in.am	<b>115 (100%)</b>		
		<b>33 (28.70%)</b>	<b>54 (46.96%)</b>	<b>28 (24.34%)</b>
6.	Public Television of Armenia	<b>455 (100%)</b>		
		<b>60 (13.18%)</b>	<b>259 (56.92%)</b>	<b>136 (29.90%)</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>2158 (100%)</b>		
		<b>952 (44.11%)</b>	<b>668 (30.96%)</b>	<b>538 (24.93%)</b>

**Table No. 5**

<b>April-May, 2024</b>		
<b>№</b>	<b>Topics/subtopics</b>	<b>Number of expert references (percentage of total / %)</b>
1.	<i>The attitude towards the initiated process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border</i>	<b>87 (52.10%)</b>
1.1.	Events directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	80 (47.90%)
1.2.	Events in the border area not directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	7 (4.20%)
2.	<i>The attitude towards the platforms/format of negotiations for the peaceful settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>32 (19.17%)</b>
2.1.	With the US mediation/engagement	10 (5.98%)
2.2.	With the RF mediation/engagement	10 (5.98%)
2.3.	With the EU mediation/engagement	7 (4.21%)
2.4.	Regional format	3 (1.80%)
2.5.	Bilateral format	2 (1.20%)
3.	<i>The attitude towards the possibilities of the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>29 (17.36%)</b>
3.1.	Signing of a peace treaty	29 (17.36%)
3.2.	Establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan	0 (0%)
3.3.	Cooperation in economic, energy and other sectors	0 (0%)
4.	<i>The RA official attitude towards the Artsakh issue</i>	<b>14 (8.38%)</b>
4.1.	Integration of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh in the RA	10 (5.99%)
4.2.	The presence of the Artsakh issue in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations	4 (2.39%)
4.3.	The rights of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh	0 (0%)
5.	<i>The attitude towards the unblocking of communications</i>	<b>4 (2.40%)</b>
5.1.	“Crossroads of Peace” project	2 (1.20%)
5.2.	Unblocking of “all communications” with no specification	1 (0.60%)
5.3.	Free communication between “mainland” Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan	1 (.60%)
5.4.	Within the bounds of Armenia’s full sovereignty	0 (0%)
5.5.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road under the supervision of the RF FSB border guard troops	0 (%)
5.6.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road with the engagement of other international actors	0 (0%)
6.	<i>Ethnic enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis</i>	<b>1 (0.59%)</b>
6.1.	Armenophobia	1 (0.59%)

6.2.	Azerophobia	0 (0%)
6.3.	Turkophobia	0 (0%)
6.4.	Islamophobia	0 (0%)
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>167 (100%)</b>

Positive, negative and neutral reactions are categorized by colors:

- **positive (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement);**
- **negative (not seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement);**
- **neutral (the possibility of reaching an agreement appears vague).**

**Table No. 6**

<b>April-May 2024</b>				
<b>№</b>	<b>Topics/subtopics</b>	<b>Number of expert references (total - 100%)</b>		
		<b>Most often, positive opinions were voiced (seeing the possibility of reaching an agreement)</b>		
1.	<i>The attitude towards the unblocking of communications</i>	<b>4 (100%)</b>		
		<b>2</b> <b>(50.00%)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(50.00%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
1.1.	“Crossroads of Peace” project	<b>2 (100%)</b>		
		<b>2 (100%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
1.2.	Unblocking of “all communications” with no specification	<b>1 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
1.3.	Free communication between “mainland” Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan	<b>1 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
1.4.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road under the supervision of the RF FSB border guard troops	<b>0 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
1.5.	Unblocking of the Meghri (Syunik, Zangezur) road with the engagement of other international actors	<b>0 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
1.6.	Within the bounds of Armenia’s full sovereignty	<b>0 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
2.	<i>The attitude towards the initiated process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border</i>	<b>87 (100%)</b>		
		<b>18</b> <b>(20.69%)</b>	<b>42</b> <b>(48.28%)</b>	<b>27</b> <b>(31.03%)</b>
2.1.	Events directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	<b>80 (100%)</b>		
		<b>17</b> <b>(21.25%)</b>	<b>39</b> <b>(48.75%)</b>	<b>24</b> <b>(30.00%)</b>

2.2.	Events in the border area not directly related to the delimitation and demarcation process	<b>7 (100%)</b>		
		<b>1</b> <b>(14.30%)</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(42.85%)</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(42.85%)</b>
3.	<i>The attitude towards the possibilities of the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>29 (100%)</b>		
		<b>6</b> <b>(20.69%)</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(13.80%)</b>	<b>19</b> <b>(65.51%)</b>
3.1.	Signing of a peace treaty	<b>29 (100%)</b>		
		<b>6</b> <b>(20.69%)</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(13.80%)</b>	<b>19</b> <b>(65.51%)</b>
3.2.	Establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan	<b>0 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
3.3.	Cooperation in economic, energy and other sectors	<b>0 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
4.	<i>The attitude towards the platforms/format of negotiations for the peaceful settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations</i>	<b>32 (100%)</b>		
		<b>2</b> <b>(6.25%)</b>	<b>16</b> <b>(50.00%)</b>	<b>14</b> <b>(43.75%)</b>
4.1.	With the EU mediation/engagement	<b>7 (100%)</b>		
		<b>1</b> <b>(14.29%)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(28.57%)</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(57.14%)</b>
4.2.	With the US mediation/engagement	<b>10 (100%)</b>		
		<b>1</b> <b>(10%)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(20%)</b>	<b>7</b> <b>(70%)</b>
4.3.	With the RF mediation/engagement	<b>10 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>9</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(10%)</b>
4.4.	Regional format	<b>3 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
4.5.	Bilateral format	<b>2 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(100%)</b>
5.	<i>Ethnic enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis</i>	<b>1 (100%)</b>		
		<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(100.00%)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0%)</b>
5.1.	Armenophobia	<b>1 (100%)</b>		



		0 (0%)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
5.2.	Azerophobia	0 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
5.3.	Turkophobia	0 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
5.4.	Islamophobia	0 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<b>6.</b>				
	<i>The RA official attitude towards the Artsakh issue</i>	10 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	3 (30.00%)	7 (70.00%)
6.1.	The presence of the Artsakh issue in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations	4 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	4 (100%)	0 (0%)
6.2.	Integration of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh in the RA	10 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	3 (30.00%)	7 (70.00%)
6.3.	The rights of forcibly displaced persons from Artsakh	0 (100%)		
		0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<b>TOTAL</b>				
		167 (100%)		
		28 (16.76%)	72 (43.12%)	67 (40.12%)