by Stella Mehrabekyan
Markus Meckel, a German politician from the Social Democratic Party and evangelical priest, served as a member of the German Bundestag from 1990 to 2009. Growing up in East Germany, he has been a member of the opposition since the 1970s. In 1989, he helped found the Social Democratic Party, assuming the role of its deputy chairman. Meckel took part in the talks that ultimately led to Germany’s unification.
Mr. Meckel sat down with CivilNet’s Stella Mehrabekyan at one of Berlin’s cafés. The discussion covered the evolution of German sentiments toward Gorbachev and Putin, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, complexities surrounding Armenia and varying approaches to historical reconciliation between East and West Germany.
Responsibility and Reconciliation
– What can you say about the divergent approaches to the reconciliation and the assumption of historical responsibility in East and West Germany during their division?
– The communist government typically presented East Germans as being free from guilt for World War II, claiming that communist leadership had opposed Hitler through exile and resistance. This narrative suggested that the population had no involvement in the crimes of National Socialism. Those of my generation, born in 1952, were taught that we had nothing to do with that period, as we were aligned with the Soviet Union and therefore on the “right side of history.”
It wasn’t until 1990, during the democratic revolution and pre-unification period when I became Foreign Minister, that we made a declaration in the pre-elected parliament accepting our part in German history and acknowledging our shared guilt. This moment was crucial – we chose not to avoid responsibility, but to accept it and take on our nation’s historical burden.
The situation in West Germany was different. The Western population often viewed themselves as victims of the separation. It took time for them to understand their historical responsibility and accept consequences such as the Polish border, which involved a significant loss of German territory.
– Through my recent interactions with experts and colleagues in Germany, I would say that even today, this mindset hasn’t been fully overcome in newer generations. Why?
– A crucial element in reconciliation is the perpetrator’s acceptance of responsibility. In West Germany, the first Auschwitz trials didn’t begin until 1963, eighteen years after the war. They were initiated by a Social Democrat who had been in a concentration camp. These trials were pivotal in showing that the perpetrators were ordinary people integrated into the machinery of crime, not just monsters. This understanding of collective responsibility continues to be important for future generations.
It’s a highly important precondition to have a society, not just government leaders or the president, saying: “Sorry, we did this,” but also for there to be awareness and education to deal with these historic issues.
Another significant issue is the narrow focus on the Holocaust in German historical memory. While the Holocaust is central, other dimensions and victim groups are often neglected or unknown. For example, while most Germans know that 6 million European Jews were killed, few are aware that over 3 million Soviet prisoners of war died in German captivity, or that the siege of Leningrad resulted in 1 million deaths. The total Soviet losses of 27 million people, including various nationalities beyond Russians – Ukrainians, Armenians, and others – are not fully acknowledged. This incomplete recognition creates barriers to reconciliation. True reconciliation requires specific knowledge of crimes and injustices rather than a general recognition.
– Do you think Germany’s way of dealing with its past is a good example for other nations, like Turkey, which denies the Armenian Genocide? Are you satisfied with what Germany has done for reconciliation?
– It’s not enough. More recent initiatives, such as establishing documentation centers for Eastern European victims, are helping to address these gaps in historical understanding.
The war was conducted differently in East and West. Western countries like France were treated as equal enemies, while Eastern peoples were considered racially inferior. The Nazi ideology targeted Slavic peoples for enslavement and their elites for elimination, similar to current Russian attempts to erase Ukrainian statehood, identity and culture. This systematic destruction of cultural identity wasn’t attempted in Western Europe. Until now, young people are not taught about these topics at schools. And this is a challenge.
On the other hand, we have a quite different historic situation with Armenian Genocide. I was personally involved in the Bundestag’s declaration regarding the Armenian Genocide in 2005, which marked the 90th anniversary of the events. At the time, we had a Red-Green coalition government, and I was engaged as a Social Democrat. The initiative came from the opposition, led by my friend Hermann Götz. We worked to create a joint declaration on the matter.
In the 2005 declaration, due to objections from the Chancellor’s Foreign Ministry, we were unable to explicitly use the term “genocide” in the main resolution text. However, we found a compromise: while the main text referred to the events as “massacres,” we included the word “genocide” in the introductory section that outlined the reasoning for the resolution. Though this section didn’t carry the same legal weight, it was still significant. During my speech in the Bundestag, I clearly referred to the events as genocide.
It wasn’t until more than a decade later that it became possible to use the term “genocide” in the main text of a Bundestag resolution. To be frank, even then it was quite difficult to get this terminology approved in Germany.
– What, in your view, were the real reasons behind these objections from the government of Germany?
– That’s a very interesting question. It would be good if you could ask our president, as he was responsible for that.
– Was it due to the political ties with Turkey, as a way to avoid jeopardizing those ties? Today we observe a similar situation, with very cautious politics towards the South Caucasus, not wanting to risk ties with Azerbaijan in the energy sector.
– In my understanding, it was a mixture of political dynamics. Looking back to 2005, we had a Green Party majority, and my key negotiating partner was from the Green Party.
Let me share a notable incident: after our first declaration was submitted to the commission and was sent back, I received an important call from Chancellor Schröder’s chief of staff, who tried to persuade me not to resubmit the issue to the Bundestag. I refused to withdraw it.
Their main argument was telling: the Chancellor was scheduled to visit Turkey. This explanation revealed their concern – they didn’t want the issue to overshadow the diplomatic visit. As a compromise, I agreed to postpone our decision by just two weeks, until after the Chancellor’s visit. We proceeded with it immediately afterward.
This incident illustrates their concrete approach to trying to silence the issue. The situation with Steinmeier was different, however. In my view, Steinmeier showed a general reluctance toward such historical recognition.
Differences between Gorbachev and Putin
– Returning to today’s situation, as a person who has experienced the Cold War firsthand, would you have ever expected such a big war breaking out in the heart of Europe, resulting from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine? Is this a second Cold War or something different?
– I must say I couldn’t have imagined such a large-scale war happening in the heart of Europe, with Putin invading Ukraine. But we need to see the whole picture.
At the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev played a crucial role. For me, he is truly the hero who helped bring it to an end – not alone, but it was very much a personal matter. He started in 1985, and if we imagine the Soviet Union continuing unchanged, the results would have been catastrophic.
Gorbachev believed communism needed reform and thought it was possible. In my view, we can all be thankful for this misconception. I think communism could not be reformed, but because he thought it could, he initiated change. Had he believed reform was impossible, he wouldn’t have started at all.
A very important moment was Gorbachev’s speech in New York on December 7, 1988. It was marvelous, even for us in the German Democratic Republic. He acknowledged the importance of human rights, accepted international law, and recognized that global challenges could only be met together. Most importantly, he rejected the Brezhnev doctrine, saying that Soviet partner states could choose their own systems.
This was enormously important for those of us in opposition groups. It opened our minds – if Gorbachev was saying this, we had to be ready to step in. The Communist Party (SED) couldn’t do it. The same applied to Poland, Hungary, and other Central European countries. Gorbachev created space for self-determination. While he couldn’t carry it out himself, he opened the possibility for our own initiatives.
When it comes to Putin, this is exactly where the key difference lies. During the 1990 German unification talks, there was the difficult question about NATO membership. The Americans insisted Germany remain in NATO. Even I was skeptical then, as NATO hadn’t always played a positive role. But we had to find a way for Gorbachev to accept this, which was achieved through financial support and arrangements for troop withdrawal.
Gorbachev understood that the Soviet Union’s future depended on development and reform rather than on territory. He accepted the CSCE (now OSCE) principles that every state has the right to choose its allies. This is the fundamental difference between Putin and Gorbachev. For Gorbachev, the future wasn’t about territory but about development and self-determination. For Putin, it’s about the empire.
Putin isn’t trying to revive the Soviet Union specifically, but rather the imperial Russia of the Tsars, and even Peter I. That’s his background. He doesn’t like communism, but he loves empire and the idea of dominating neighboring peoples. He has never accepted their right to self-determination. That’s why this war is so terrible – not just for Ukraine or Moldova, but for the entire international order based on the UN Charter, which establishes the equality of states, big or small.
Putin never accepted this international order. There’s also an important connection between domestic issues and foreign policy. From the beginning, Putin worked to reverse democracy. His first step was to end the election of governors – he would appoint them instead. Step by step, civil society and media freedoms collapsed, leading to an increasingly authoritarian system and eventually dictatorship. This domestic authoritarianism is closely linked to his foreign policy of denying neighbors their right to self-determination. And that’s the difference between the two.
– There is a very popular argument that it’s the West that forced this war, leaving Putin with no choice but to start a war. What’s your take on this?
– The argument that the West forced this war by cornering Putin, leaving him no alternative, is pure propaganda. The real problem is Putin’s refusal to accept basic principles. He often talks about promises made in 1990 not to pursue NATO enlargement, but that’s incorrect. I participated in those negotiations as a GDR minister. The only NATO-related discussions focused specifically on East German territory. The agreements were clear: no nuclear weapons in East Germany and no foreign troops there. That’s all.
I actually changed my mind about NATO enlargement in the early 1990s. I came to believe it was good for security to have an integrated approach rather than each nation managing its security independently. The NATO treaty requires such integration. In 1993, when Americans proposed the Partnership for Peace as an alternative to enlargement, Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries protested. These representatives of the peaceful revolution wanted the same security as the West. Consider that Poland might have spent 10% of its GDP on security if acting alone – within NATO’s framework, they were able to achieve security with much less spending.
I was present at Putin’s famous 2007 Munich speech. I had the chance to respond first because the chairman, Mr. Teltschik, knew me, and I had raised my hand early. You can find this on YouTube. I made two points in response to Putin. First, when he accused the West of pushing enlargement, I said it wasn’t the West’s initiative but rather the pressure from concerned countries who felt insecure toward Russia – because of Russia itself. If you’re democratic, you have to include them if they want to join.
My second point was that it would actually benefit Russia if all its western neighbors were part of NATO, because NATO wasn’t aggressive. Russia would be more secure. Putin didn’t accept this, but these accusations were all about his imperial ambitions. Every imperial ambition is naturally constrained by NATO or by countries seeking protection.
Regarding Germany’s response to the war and some Germans’ attempts to justify Putin’s actions, there are different reasons for this, particularly interesting from an East German perspective. The Soviets were never loved during the GDR period—the boundaries were clear, and the SED (Communist Party) would have never won free elections during those 40 years. People were imprisoned in their own country, unable to leave, and stripped of freedom. They had to find ways to live within those constraints. They weren’t loved, especially since East Germans could watch Western TV and radio and see the freedom and prosperity possible elsewhere.
But Gorbachev changed everything. It was particularly interesting that Honecker, the East German leader, opposed Gorbachev, which only increased Gorbachev’s popularity. His open-minded approach and talk of “fresh air” convinced people, while Honecker’s resistance made people love Gorbachev more. He became, especially in East Germany, a person of hope. When he accepted German unification, he became almost god-like.
This sentiment continued, and for people in the former East Germany who weren’t closely following policy developments, Gorbachev represented Moscow, and this sympathy transferred to Russia even after the Soviet Union’s dissolution. There’s also the narrative that Russia liberated Germany from Hitler, with great sacrifices, and then Gorbachev brought freedom again by helping end the GDR regime. Putin, ironically, benefits from this love for Gorbachev, despite opposing what Gorbachev stood for.
– Do you see the end of the Ukrainian war in the visible future? How do you envision a victory for either side? Who could mediate in those negotiations, and what role could Germany play in this process?
– I must note that I’ve been struggling against pro-Putin policies in Germany for over 20 years. In 2001, as a parliamentarian and vice president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I wrote to the American Senate supporting Baltic NATO membership. I argued we couldn’t repeat Hitler’s mistake of abandoning the Baltic states to Stalin – it was our duty to protect them. I’ve consistently opposed the approaches of Steinmeier and Merkel, warning against trusting Putin both in domestic issues and regarding NATO. It’s been a long fight within Germany.
Even in 2014, it wasn’t enough – the resistance to that, the sanctions, and so on. I was fighting against it within Germany. But in 2002, I accepted and welcomed the Chancellor’s speech about the so-called Zeitenwende (turning point). This was really important. However, I wasn’t happy about the restrictions. I was very clear about it from the start, and I can send you texts on that.
I’ve always been clear that we must stand with Ukraine. We need to provide them with everything they need to defend themselves – tanks, long-range weapons, planes, whatever it takes. They must have the ability to protect themselves. This has been my general approach. To this day, I am criticizing my own government for not doing enough. The weapons we’ve sent are either too late in arriving or insufficient. This is my first point.
But in the end, it’s not up to us to decide to what extent or when Ukraine should negotiate or reach an agreement. That is a domestic issue for Ukraine. What we need to focus on is what we can do. And I believe we, as the West, are guilty here.
Even in 2023, if we had sent more and better weapons more quickly, the Russians would not have been able to advance on the front lines the way they did. Our response has been too slow. The difficult military situation in Ukraine is partly – though not entirely – our responsibility.
On the other hand, in contrast to other voices in Germany calling for negotiations, I ask: what sort of negotiations should they be? It cannot be a negotiation based on surrender or capitulation; that cannot be accepted by Ukraine. Look at what happened in Bucha – this kind of occupation is something we cannot ask Ukrainians to endure.
The second point is that accepting such a scenario would destroy the international order. If Ukraine surrenders, who will be next? After five years, Russia could be strong enough to take Moldova or any other country. They’re already doing it, and we need to acknowledge that.
“Germany should do everything to support Armenia”
Take Armenia, for instance. It is, in my view, one of the most burdened countries in Europe, especially in terms of this situation, much like Moldova, but they have greater influence.
I like what Pashinyan is doing, even though I don’t agree with every point. But what alternative does he have? On one hand, he has to try to move closer to the West, to Europe. On the other hand, he remains heavily dependent on Russia in every aspect. That’s why, I think, we should be doing everything we can to support Armenia: politically, economically, and militarily. We need to stop this situation from deteriorating. We should encourage Armenia, provide financial support, and offer structures of aid. But we’re not clear enough on this; it’s all just rhetoric without real action.
We should be ready to send troops, even if just as observers, to the border. But not just 10 people—we need to send a clear message: there are red lines, and we will enforce them. We must draw those red lines for both Putin and for Azerbaijan and Turkey.
– What holds Europe back from doing more? Some support has, indeed, been provided, including weapons from France, and assistance from the European Peace Facility, but the country understandably expects more to defend itself. What, in your view, hinders additional assistance? Is it the factor of Azerbaijan, or the fear of opening a second front with Russia, or something else?
– I would say it’s egoism – plain and simple. And it’s tied to energy interests. That’s the core issue. I saw this coming in 2022 when everything was happening – when Ursula von der Leyen visited Azerbaijan and shook hands with their leaders. That was strange. Nothing was said about what was happening to Armenia.
I attended a conference in Azerbaijan at that time about the cultural issues of Artsakh, where there was a book on the topic. The situation was disastrous. It’s a shame. This kind of behavior by Europe is encouraging Azerbaijan and Turkey. Of course, it is. We have to be firm and clear: we can’t have one aggressor that’s hated and another that’s favored. That’s not acceptable.
Azerbaijan’s behavior mirrors Russia’s aggressiveness, especially in Artsakh. What happened there was a war of occupation. They took the land, and that’s exactly how it went down. And Europe’s reaction has been a disaster. I’m not personally involved, but I feel guilty for letting it happen.
That’s why I firmly believe that Germany, in particular, has to do much more. We need to be much more active on every level in supporting Armenia.
– Does Germany have any leverage to put pressure on Azerbaijan in case it attacks Armenia again? This threat is still quite real.
– Germany is not a small country – it could and should take initiative, and not just talk at a civil level; it needs to be active.
We need to take a stronger initiative. We must show that we’re serious.
In terms of military support, we should clarify that there are red lines. And in my view, this shouldn’t be about NATO membership – that’s not feasible in this specific context. But a defense treaty with Armenia or Moldova could be possible. It would be something lower than full NATO membership, but still a clear commitment – that would show Russia that there is a red line, and it must be credible. We should be willing to bring troops to implement it.
I would be in favor of that approach. We need a credible deterrent in place.
This article was published within the frames of “Correspondents in Conflict” Project,
implemented by Yerevan Press Club and Deutsche Gesellschaft e. V. The Project is
funded by the German Federal Foreign Office within the “Eastern Partnership Program”.
The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the implementing partners and can in
no way be taken to reflect the views of the Federal Foreign Office. #civilsocietycooperation
Stella Mehrabekyan holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Yerevan State University. She joined CivilNet in 2011. Prior to that, she worked in the European Union’s E-Gov.Am program through the Armenian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (Aeplac), with experience in the Foreign Ministry. Currently, she works at CivilNet as Senior Editor. Stella also conducts interviews in Armenian and Russian on political, regional and social topics.
